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AN EXEGETICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAY
ON THE CONCEPT OF *RASA*
WITHIN THE WORK OF
BHARATA, ĀNANDAVARDHANA, AND ABHINAVAGUPTA
A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF INTEGRAL STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE
MASTER OF ARTS
BY
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
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
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Certificate of Approval

I certify that I have read *An Exegetical and Historical Essay on the Concept of Rasa within the work of Bharata, Ānandavardhana, and Abhinavagupta* by Timothy P. Lighthiser. It is my opinion that this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the Master of Arts Degree in Philosophy and Religion at the California Institute of Integral Studies, San Francisco, California.


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Abstract
An Exegetical and Historical Essay
on the Concept of *Rasa* within the Work of
Bharata, Ānandavardhana, and Abhinavagupta
by
Timothy P. Lighthiser

The first chapter will examine and define the terms found within the *rasa-sūtra* of Bharata in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, the *classicus locus* of Indian aesthetics.

The second chapter will explicate the concept of *rasa* as it was discussed in the *Dhvanyāloka*. For Ānandavardhana, *rasa* was the aesthetic emotion which was suggested (*dhvani*) to the experient of a poem. Special emphasis will be paid to the essence and development of *dhvani-rasa* and its relationship to *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and *Vyākaraṇa*. Excerpts from Jacobi's German translation of key passages from the *Dhvanyāloka* will be included.

The last chapter will examine the concept of *rasa* as it is found with the *Abhinavabhāratī* and the *Dhvanyālokalocana*. For Abhinavagupta, *rasa* becomes a 'metaphysical' and 'theological' concept which was similar to the experience of realizing Brahman. Special emphasis will be paid to the essence and development of the concept of *śānta-rasa* in the *Śivasūtra-s* and the *Tantrāloka*.

**To my Mother, Father,
and Sujin, meine Freude**

कवेरभिप्रायमशब्दगोचरं
स्फुरन्तमाद्रेषु पदेषु केवलम्
वदद्भिरङ्गैः कुतरोमविक्रियै-
र्जनस्य तूष्णीं भवतोऽयमञ्जलिः

Beyond reach of words is the meaning of the poet,
which bristles in words brimming with sentiment;
Salutations to him (the critic) who keeps silence
while his limbs eloquently express the meaning through horripilated limbs.¹

[Vijjikā-Sanskrit Poetress]

¹ Translated by R. C. Dwivedi

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REFERENCE LIST

A Note on Transliteration

The transliteration of the Sanskrit terms used in this thesis are in accordance with the standardized system found within the "Introduction" of Monier Williams' *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. However, there are three exceptions: *r̥* replaces Williams' *ri*, *ṣ* replaces his *sh*, and *ṩ* replaces his *s* with an overdot. Furthermore, when a noun was plural in number I have denoted this plurality by adding -s to the singular form of the noun.

Sanskrit Pronunciation

According to

George L. Hart

Vowels:

a is pronounced like the initial a of America

ā is pronounced like the a of father

i is pronounced like the i of in

ī is pronounced like ee in deep

u is pronounced like the oo in too

ū is pronounced like the oo in too, but long and not a diphthong

ṛ is pronounced like the -er in butter, but rolled

Diphthongs:

e is pronounced like the ai in paint

ai is pronounced like the i in kite

o is pronounced like the o in pole

au is pronounced like the ow in cow

Consonants:

k is pronounced like the k in sky

kh is pronounced like the c in cake

g is pronounced like the g in gamble

gh has no English equivalent, but it can be pronounced by saying h and g at the same time

ñ is pronounced like the ng in going

c is pronounced like the ch in chain, but unaspirated

ch is pronounced like the ch in chain

j is pronounced like the j in jump

jh is pronounced by saying j and h at the same time

ñ is pronounced like the n in onion

ṭ is pronounced like the t in tank, but it is unaspirated and retroflexed

ṭh is pronounced like the t in tank, but it is retroflexed

ḍ is pronounced like the d in doctor, but it is retroflexed

ḍh is pronounced like the ḍ, but it is aspirated

ṇ is pronounced like the n in earn, but it is more retroflexed

t is pronounced like the t in start

th is pronounced like the t in tip

d is pronounced like the d in dip

dh is pronounced like the d, but it is aspirated

n is pronounced like the n in nose, but it is dental

p is pronounced like the p in spark

ph is pronounced like the p in path

b is pronounced like the b in bat

bh is pronounced like a b, but aspirated

m is pronounced like the m in mother

Semivowels:

y is pronounced like the y in yes

r is pronounced like the r in razor in some English dialects; it should be rolled

l is pronounced like the l in lip

v is pronounced like the v in velvet

Sibilants:

ś is pronounced like the sh in English, but it is more palatal

ṣ is pronounced like the ti in partial, but it is more retroflexed

s is pronounced like the s in sit

h is pronounced like the h in him

Other sounds:

ḥ is pronounced like a short echo, e.g. devaḥ would be pronounced like de va ha

ṁ is pronounced like m at the end of words, inside a word it becomes a nasal of the group to which the consonant belongs

**The Sanskrit Alphabet
and its Transliterated Equivalents**

Consonants

	glottal	velar	palatal	retroflex	dental	labial
unaspirated voiceless		k क	c च	ʈ ट	t त	p प
aspirated stops		kh ख	ch छ	ʈh ठ	th थ	ph फ
unaspirated voiced		g ग	j ज	ɖ ड	d द	b ब
aspirated		gh घ	jh झ	ɖh ढ	dh ध	bh भ
nasals		ṅ ङ	ñ ञ	ṇ ण	n न	m म
liquids			y य	r र	l ल	v व
voiceless fricatives	h ः		ś श	ṣ ष	s स	
voiced	h ह					

Vowels

short	a अ	i इ	r ऋ	l ऌ	u उ
long	ā आ	ī ई	ī ऋ		ū ऊ

Diphthongs

e ए	o ओ
ai ऐ	au औ

Introduction

In India, as in the West, the discipline of aesthetics is that school of thought which seeks to identify the means by which we are emotionally affected when we experience an art form, that is to say, an aesthete is one who identifies those elements within an art form which evoke the emotions of the experient. For example, I am drawn toward the work of the Beethoven, particularly the 9th Symphony. The tone and gravity of certain notes played and sung in the 9th lead me to a sense of being which is very familiar, but is at the same time completely foreign in that there is no relationship between myself and my personal life to the sounds that reverberate within my body. When I hear the 9th, for some reason, my heart and mind begins to fill, to overfill, with a heightened sense of awareness which is difficult to describe, but is close to that sense and feeling when one recognizes a cherished loved one that has been forever lost in the glacial pace of time. It is a sense of ineffable joy brought about through recognition. The sound of their voices and the instruments being played is that which has made my sense of time melt, and the sounds which I hear is that which has caused a stream of water born from joy to flow, but for some reason, I cannot exactly account for the way in which these sounds have affected me. The job of the aesthete is to assist the experient and identify those exact elements within the art form which have caused him/her to have such an experience.

In Indian aesthetics, a person who has been emotionally affected by an art form is described as being a *sahṛdaya*, which means “same-hearted”; *sa* means “with” and *hṛdaya* means “heart.” Thus a *sahṛdaya* is one whose heart, the emotional seat of consciousness, has been de-individualized and conjoined with the heart of the artist. This *sahṛdaya* is said to have experienced *rasa*.

Rasa is the Sanskrit word used to denote the aesthetic configuration. *Rasa* is the most important concept within the discipline of Indian aesthetics.

Thus, the first chapter of this thesis, “Bharata and *Rasa*,” will examine the concept of *rasa* as it was initially expounded upon by Bharata in an ancient dramaturgical text called the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* contains the famous aphorism called the *rasa-sūtra*, which states: *vibhāva anubhāva vyabhicāri saṃyogād rasa niṣpattiḥ*, which means *rasa* (the aesthetic configuration) is born (*niṣpattiḥ*) from the combination (*saṃyogād*) of the *vibhāva*-s (the causes), the *anubhāva*-s (the external effects of these causes), and the *vyabhicāri*-s (the transient emotions displayed). This first chapter is devoted to the task of defining the meaning of the terms within the *rasasūtra*.

The second chapter of this thesis, “Ānandavardhana and *Rasa*,” will explicate the concept of *rasa* as it was understood by the poetician Ānandavardhana in the *Saḥṛdayāloka*. The *Saḥṛdayāloka*, more commonly referred to as the *Dhvanyāloka* within secondary literature, is also considered like the *Nāṭyaśāstra* as a “foundational text” within the discipline of Indian aesthetics. Ānandavardhana in the *Dhvanyāloka* recognizes the canonical status of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, but aims to extend the parameters of *rasa* as it was discussed in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* into the sphere of poetic analysis. For Ānandavardhana, *rasa* was the aesthetic emotion which was suggested (*dhvani*) to the experience of a poem or drama. Ānandavardhana's theory of *rasa* as a suggested entity was greatly influenced by the semantic theories of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*-s (the school of Vedic exegesis) and the *Vyākaraṇa* (the school of Grammatical analysis). Ānandavardhana's theory of *rasa* marks the second stage of the *rasa* theory, thus the second chapter of this thesis is devoted to the task of explicating the essence and the development of the concept of *rasadhvani*.

This second chapter will also provide numerous examples of *dhvani* from the *Dhvanyāloka* for illustrative purposes, including excerpts from Herman Jacobi's turn of the century translation of the *Dhvanyāloka* into German.

The third and final chapter of this thesis, "Abhinavagupta and *Rasa*," will examine the concept of *rasa* as it was expounded upon by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* called the *Abhinavabhāratī* and in his commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka* called the *Dhvanyālokalocana*. In these two commentaries, Abhinavagupta recognizes the canonical authority of Bharata and Ānandavardhana, but Abhinavagupta seeks to extend the parameters of the concept of *rasa* into the geminal realm of metaphysics and theology within Kashmir Śaivism. Abhinavagupta's theory of *rasa* marks the third and 'highest' stage of the *rasa* theory, thus this last chapter is devoted to the task of expounded upon the essence and development of Abhinavagupta's theory of *rasa*.

This final chapter will also include excerpts from the *Śivasūtra*-s of Vasugupta which I believe may have in some way influenced Abhinavagupta's aesthetic notions to a great extent. These passages seem to be intimately related to Abhinava's aesthetic assertions, but Abhinavagupta does not directly cite them within his own writing. Thus the influence of these passages on Abhinavagupta's work is not certain.

This last chapter will also participate in a contemporary debate on the chronology of Abhinavagupta's work. Daniel H. H. Ingalls in his "Introduction" to the translation of the *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Locana* re-examined and contested K. C. Pandey's topical periodization of Abhinavagupta's work. I will re-examine Ingalls' argument and then assert a position which re-instates Pandey's chronology.

With Pandey's chronology in place, I will then assert a basis for Abhinavagupta's theory of *rasa* within the *Tantrāloka*. I have excerpted a passage from the *Tantrāloka* which predates the *Abhinavabhāratī* and the *Dhvanyālokalocana* which exemplifies Abhinavagupta's most mature understanding of *rasa* in a prototypical form.

Thence, I will then conclude by illustrating Abhinavagupta's argument in the *Abhinavabhāratī* for the inclusion of *śāntarasa*, the aesthetic configuration of tranquillity, into the original list of eight *rasa*-s prescribed by Bharata in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*.

In sum, this thesis is an exegetical and historical essay on the concept of *rasa* within the work of Bharata, Ānandavardhana, and Abhinavagupta.

Chapter 1 The Bharata and *Rasa*

The भारतीयनाट्यशास्त्र (*Bhāratīyanāṭyaśāstra*), more commonly known as the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (*Nś*), is a dramaturgical text from ancient India. The *Nś* is a voluminous and complex text that is traditionally ascribed to a sage named Bharata; the *Nś* is basically an extensive and extremely detailed instructional manual that was created for those within the field of theater, viz., the playwright, the director, and the performer. The work is traditionally described by scholars to be organized and divided into four sections based on *abhinaya*-s, or modes of representation: 1) *sāttvika* (sentiments and emotions), 2) *āṅgika* (representation with the body), 3) *vācika* (through the voice), 4) *āhārya* (make-up, costumes, lighting, etc.).

The exact date of the inception of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and the identity its original author has caused a reasonable amount of discussion in scholarly circles: Rene Daumal points out that the language in which it is written is simple and precise, and that the *Nāṭyaśāstra* is devoid of the “precious or baroque ornamentation of later Sanskrit”;¹ he points out that within the *Nāṭyaśāstra* there is a plenitude of vocabulary from the Prakrit and Dravidian languages which suggests to Daumal an original date of the text which is pre-Aryan; Edwin Gerow explains that the *Nāṭyaśāstra* is usually dated no later than the sixth century, but additionally points out that the work contains elements from the second century, and thence writes that: “it is thus roughly contemporaneous with the great flowering of dramatic and other literature under the patronage of the Gupta kings (4th-6th centuries), and it reflects the

¹ Rene Daumal, *Rasa or Knowledge of the Self: Essays on Indian Aesthetics and Selected Sanskrit Studies*, trans. Louise Landes Levi (New York: New Direction Books, 1982), 39.

cultural and aesthetic realities of that flowering”;² Bharat Gupt writes that: “the text of the *Nś* was in existence when the *Rāmāyaṇa* was being composed by Vālmiki . . . [which] means that [the] *Nś* was in circulation around the 5th century B.C., if not earlier. In other words, its basic concepts on dance and drama were prevalent in India a long time before Aristotle’s *Poetics* was recorded in 355-335 B.C.”;³ Gupt explains that Bharata was “not a great dancer or actor . . . nor simply an *ācārya* (a teacher) but a profound thinker who collected all the available material related to performance and gave it coherence and structure related to the ethos of stage-skills”;⁴ V. K. Chari, along with many other scholars, dates the *Nāṭyaśāstra* between 200 B.C. and 200 A. D.; and Patrick Colm Hogan explains that the *Nś* was “composed by a number of authors between the second century B. C. E. and the sixth century C. E.”⁵ According to Chari, the *Nāṭyaśāstra* was discovered in 1865 embedded in a commentary on the text called the *Abhinavabhāratī* by Abhinavagupta. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* is said to be of two different lengths: one version contains six thousand verses and thirty seven chapters, while the other version contains twelve thousand verses and thirty six chapters which is said by some to be in harmony with and correspond to the thirty six principles of the *Pratyabhijñā* sect of Kashmir Śaivism.⁶ The latter is the version of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* that scholars have today and it is also called the *Ṣaṭsahasrī*; two of its thirty six chapters, chapter six and chapter seven, are at the heart of this essay.

² Jan Gonda, ed., *A History of Indian Literature*, vol. 5 Fasc. 3, *Indian Poetics*, by Edwin Gerow (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977), 245.

³ Bharat Gupt, *Dramatic Concepts Greek and Indian* (New Delhi: D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd., 1994), 15.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁵ Patrick Colm Hogan, “Toward a Cognitive Science of Poetics: Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, and the Theory of Literature,” *College Literature* 23 (1996): 165, online. Available: <http://melvyl@nui.ucop.edu>, 9 June 1998.

⁶ K. Krishnamoorthy, *The Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni: with the Commentary Abhinavabharatī by Abhinavaguptācārya (Nāṭyaśāstra)*, 4th rev. ed. (Vadodara: Oriental Institute, 1992), 24.

The *Nāṭyaśāstra* is most frequently associated with the famous *rasa-sūtra* of Bharata in which he states in chapter six: विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसंयोगादसनिष्पत्तिः (*vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṃyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ*) which is translated by Edwin Gerow as:

The *rasa* exists or is produced from (we would prefer 'as') a combination of . . . *vibhāvas* 'causes of emotion' e. g. the persons and circumstances represented,' *anubhāvas* 'effects, consequences or external signs of emotions' and *vyabhicāribhāvas* 'transitory states (of mind).'⁷

This statement is the *locus classicus* of Indian aesthetics. The *sūtra* has a very specific meaning with respect to Bharata and drama. Soon after this statement was uttered by Bharata, the field of aesthetics was born in that subsequent aesthetes, like Ānandavardhana, Abhinava, et alia, commented on the *sūtra* and inflected the meaning with their own particular taste for the aesthetic in which the original meaning of the statement which was directed at the objective qualities of the aesthetic experience in a dramatic performance was redirected inward, toward the subjective quality of the aesthetic experience within a poetic experience. In essence, the *rasasūtra* of Bharata is the matrix in which the geminal pair of dramatic and poetic criticism in India was created.

With this bifurcation in mind, I would like to begin an analysis of the *rasasūtra* with respect to Bharata and dramaturgical theory, and begin this study by deconstructing the statement as one would conventionally examine a Sanskrit compound, that is, by initially analyzing the term at the end of the compound. *Niṣpattiḥ* is the first element that we will study in the phrase (*vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṃyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ*); निष्पत्तिः *niṣ-pattiḥ* is a prefixed verb; *pattiḥ*, is derived from the verbal root पद् *pad*, which means

⁷ Jan Gonda, ed., *A History of Indian Literature*, vol. 5 Fasc. 3, *Indian Poetics*, by Edwin Gerow (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977), 245

according to William Dwight Whitney “to go,” while the prefix निस् *nis* which is affixed to the root may be translated as a word which implies separation; *niṣpattiḥ* according to V. S. Apte means, “to issue out of, be brought about, arise, to become ripe”; Raniero Gnoli defines the term as “production”; Sushil Kumar De defines it literally as “consummation”; and Gupta states that *niṣpattiḥ* implies “falling down,” which suggests to him “the dripping of an extract.”

The dripping extract Gupta refers to is रस *rasa*,⁸ the term which appears before the last element of the compound (*vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṃyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ*). Gupta writes that “there is no word in the history of Indian aesthetics which has acquired a greater significance than *rasa*.”⁹ M. Hiriyanna explains that references to *rasa* “are found in very early Sanskrit words, but [the term] was not formulated and clearly expounded until the 9th century A. D.”¹⁰ Apte defines the nominal form of *rasa* as “sap, juice (of trees),” and Böhtlingk and Roth define रस् *ras*, its verbal root, as “*schmecken*,” which means in “to taste,” and the derivative nominal form of the verbal root *ras* as “*Saft, aus Pflanzen*”; *rasa* in Latin translates to “*sapor, gustus, succus, liquidum*.” Gerow provides a historical account of the term’s usage in Indian literature and writes:

The term *rasa* is well attested in early Indian literature in the allied senses of ‘sap/essence’ and ‘taste’; both notions are deeply imbued with overtones of “liquidity,” inasmuch as both sap, the “essence” of plants, etc., is liquid, and the capacity to taste takes the peculiar form of “liquidity” as its object . . . , so that *rasa* is even seen in the physical theories as the very differentia of the liquid element. . . . Citations of the objective reference of *rasa* go back all the way to the R̥gveda, where, not unexpectedly, it often designates the “essence” (scil. ‘power,’ in German ‘Kraft’) of the *soma* plant; the subjective reference (to ‘taste’) goes back at least to the

⁸ The following are general definitions. A listing and explanation of the eight *rasa*-s of Bharata will be included at the end of the chapter.

⁹ Bharat Gupta, *Dramatic Concepts Greek and Indian* (New Delhi: D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd., 1994), 260.

¹⁰ M. Hiriyanna, *Art Experience* (Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1954), 28.

Śatapathabrāhmaṇa. . . e.g., 14,5 4,11 in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka.¹¹

K. C. Pandey expands upon these entries and writes and defines *rasa* in the following paragraph:

The word “Rasa” in Sanskrit is used in a variety of meanings. In common language, which follows the Vaiśeṣika system, it is used for the quality, cognisable through the sense of taste. As such it is of six kinds, sweet, sour, saltish, etc. In Āyurveda it is used for a certain white liquid, extracted by the digestive system from the food. Its main seat is in the heart. Therefrom it proceeds to the arteries and nourishes the whole system. It also stands for liquid in general, extracted from any fruit or flower etc., inclination, liking or desire, mineral or metallic, salt and mercury. In the contexts of aesthetics, however, it stands for the aesthetic object. It has a highly technical meaning, though even in a technical sense it retains the element of the original meaning, namely, the object of relish, not sensuous, but aesthetic.¹²

Privas Jivan Chaudhuri continues Pandey’s Āyurvedic definition of *rasa* and writes that:

The key term used by Bharata . . . to describe the tragic effect is *rasa* and this is originally a physiological term and figures in the medicinal literature of India. It means the physical quality of taste and also any one of [the] six tastes These six kinds of tastes severally characterize the six bodily humours. Bharata also follows this in his dramaturgy where he defines *rasa* by the quality of the taste, as it is done in the medical literature of the time, using the same word therein. Bharata first says that there six *rasas* . . . but later says there are eight. Now when the medical ideas of his time influenced him so much, it is safe to surmise that the idea of a cure will color his view of the function of tragedy. Then Bharata could not, and he did not, as many of his terms show, pass by the Yoga of Patañjali which was no less a cultural influence of the time of medicinal science, and this taught men how to purify the mind of all disquietude and bring it back to its inherent state of freedom and bliss.¹³

However, De cautions us of the latter two definitions and tries to explain to us that *rasa*:

Has been translated etymologically by the terms flavour, relish, gustation, taste, *Geschmack*, or *saveur*, but none of these renderings seems adequate. “Mood,” or the term “*Stimmung*” used by Jacobi, may be the nearest approach to it, but the concept has hardly any analogy in European critical theories. Most of the terms have ideational associations of their own, and are not therefore strictly applicable. For instance, “taste” and “relish,” though literally correct, must not be understood to imply

¹¹ Jan Gonda, ed., *A History of Indian Literature*, vol. 5 Fasc. 3, *Indian Poetics*, by Edwin Gerow (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977), 245.

¹² K. C. Pandey, *Comparative Aesthetics*, vol. 1 2d ed. (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1959), 20.

¹³ Privas Jivan Chaudhuri, “Catharsis in the Light of Indian Aesthetics,” *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 24 (1965): 154.

aesthetic or moral judgment, “good” or “bad” taste, but must be taken to indicate an idea similar to what we mean when we speak of food. At the same time, this realistic description must not drag it down to the level of bodily pleasure; for this artistic pleasure is given as almost equivalent to the philosophic bliss, known as *ānanda*, being lifted above world joy.¹⁴

According to S. S. Barlingay and B. M Chaturvedi, Bharata’s theory of *rasa* is definitely not as De describes it in the last line of his definition. Chaturvedi writes that “the theory of *Rasa* as is presented by Bharata is purely technical and scientific without any philosophical complications.”¹⁵ And Barlingay prefers to retain Bharata’s original meaning of *rasa* as an objectified form of aesthetic pleasure produced by the drama and he avoids the philosophically flavored notion of *rasa* that is associated in later writers with the medium of poetry; Barlingay asserts that this subsequent philosophically oriented description of *rasa* is one based upon a misunderstanding of the key terms within the *rasasūtra*; he points out that, Abhinavagupta and Bhaṭṭanāyaka, the primary agents of the reorientation, fused two concepts that in actuality should be kept distinct. Barlingay initially discusses the meaning of the word “*nāṭya*” and states that Bharata defines the term as “the *imitation* of that which takes place in the real world.”¹⁶ He continues and points out the significance of the medium of the stage and then locates this medium as the place in which the subjectivity of the artist is objectified. Barlingay points out that Abhinava in his commentary on the *Nś*, called the *Abhinavabhāratī*, states, “*Kāvyaṃ Nāṭyameva*,” which means *nāṭya* (drama) is *kāvya* (poetry). However, poetry and drama are two distinct forms of media; they greatly differ in Barlingay’s mind in that he believes in the necessity of the physical and individual

¹⁴ S. K. De, *Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of the Aesthetic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 54-55.

¹⁵ B. M. Chaturvedi, *Some Unexplored Aspects of the Rasa Theory*, trans. P. Sri Ramachandrudu (Delhi: Vidyavidhi Prakashan, 1996), 17.

¹⁶ S. S. Barlingay, “What did Bharata Mean by *Rasa*,” *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* 8 (1981): 433.

constituents which comprise the whole of a drama, and he recognizes the absence of such elements within a poem, in other words, Barlingay deviates not from the original *rasasūtra* in that the words uttered prior to “*rasa niṣpattiḥ*,” viz., *vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri* have corresponding elements within the physical world of drama which are basically the *abhinaya-s* (*sāttvika, āṅgika, vācika, āhārya*), the four modes of representation, which are the central theme and organizing principle of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. For Barlingay, Bharata was very interested in the process of creating *rasa*; Bharata was dissimilar to some of his commentators in that “he was mainly interested in the production or *Niṣpattiḥ* of *Rasa*.”¹⁷ and that Bharata “wanted to show how to transform the content that was in the poet’s [playwright’s] mind into the stage language.”¹⁸ Barlingay asserts that Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta were primarily concerned with the experience of the participant of the artistic form in which the *niṣpattiḥ*, the production of *rasa* was not a possibility; for them, *rasa* was not “created,” “produced”; it was already in existence as a latent form that had to be revealed, or uncovered by the insightful appreciator. Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinava from Barlingay’s perspective, “missed the point that Bharata distinguished between the process of the production of *Rasa* (*Rasa-niṣpattiḥ*) and the experiencing or tasting of *Rasa* (*Rasāvada*). They, therefore, thought ‘*Rasa*’ intrinsic to the appreciator and manifested only in him, was, therefore, mental in nature (*Āsvādarūpa*).”¹⁹ This notion stands in diametric opposition to Bharata’s assertion of *rasa* as an objective entity. Barlingay posits that Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta were totally unconcerned with 1) the subjective state of the artist, the origin from which the artistic form grew forth, and 2) the objectification of the

¹⁷ Ibid., 444.

¹⁸ Ibid., 434.

¹⁹ Ibid., 444.

subjectivity of the artist, which are, according to Barlingay, the two most important elements of the famous *rasasūtra*. Barlingay explains that:

It seems clear that these great scholars imposed their own theories on Bharata oblivious of his profound concern with the actual staging of a drama. Their theories may be important in the history of poetics and aesthetics; but they should not be allowed to replace Bharata's older theory which has its own great virtues. It is only by misinterpreting Bharata's intentions and misreading Bharata's text that a theory like that of Abhinavagupta could be super-imposed on Nāṭyaśāstra. The problem before Bharata was relatively simple, it was how to exhibit a drama. All that he tries to do is to explain the different aspects of this technique which concerns the body of Nāṭya. The problem for Abhinavagupta was purely philosophic and I believe that Bharata's concern with the technique of production has been entirely sacrificed for the sake of philosophic speculation. Indeed a genuine theory of aesthetic consciousness did emerge from it, but a theory of art was also lost.²⁰

Chari explains the substantive differences between the dramatic and non-dramatic:

The narrative is presented through the verbal medium alone, where as stage drama employs both the verbal and visual mediums. The dialogic structure is of course what distinguishes drama from the narrative formally and what makes enactment possible. But Bharata seems to imply that, since dialogue is conceived as a mode of performative or gestic behavior, it is inseparable from the physical exhibitions that accompany stage action invariably. . . . [Bharata] conceives of drama holistically, as a total act, rather than simply as a particular 'manner' of verbal representation.²¹

Radical tangents that deviate from the original meaning of the *rasasūtra* are not uncommon; in fact, it is these divergences which form the discipline of Indian Aesthetics. Abhinavagupta's interpretation of the *sūtra* is the most enduring, however it was not the first.

The first scholar to examine and comment on the meaning of the *rasasūtra* was Lollaṭa. Gerow explains that Lollaṭa's view of the *sūtra* was commonsensical, and that Lollaṭa's theory explained the production of *rasa* through a cause-effect analysis, meaning, *rasa* was caused into existence by combination of the structural elements of the drama with

²⁰ Ibid., 445.

what is known as *sthāyibhāva*, which is, defined by Bharata as an inherent stable, permanent emotion which is common and at the core of human experience. Gupt explains Lollaṭa's position using Lollaṭa's own words:

When there is union (*saṃyoga*) of *vibhāvas* and others with *sthāyī*, then there is the emergence of *rasa*. Here *vibhāva* is the cause of the birth of a mental state which is full of *sthāyī bhāvas*. Here (in this *sūtra*), it is indicated that *anubhāvas* are not the cause of *rasa* (that is, *anubhāvas* do not get converted into *rasa*). They do not deserve to be counted among the causes, of *rasa* emergence. Only *bhāvas* deserve that. Because of the very nature of the mind . . . *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicārīs* are not such that they can be of identical make-up . . .; however, the nature of the *sthāyī bhāvas*, as well as deep-rooted desires . . ., is clarified here. . . . The *sthāyī*, when it combines with . . . *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* becomes *rasa*. When this does not happen, it remains *sthāyī*. By the power of concentration . . . this *rasa* can occur in the character . . . and in the actor.²²

Lollaṭa's interpretation then is different from Bharata's in that for Lollaṭa *rasa* exists in two places: 1) in the original person that is being portrayed on stage, and 2) the representative actor who does the portraying of the original person. Lollaṭa's *rasa* theory is similar though to Bharata's in that Lollaṭa asserts that *rasa* is "produced." De points out that Lollaṭa:

took the *vibhāva* as the direct cause . . . of *Rasa*, which therefore is an effect, and the term *niṣpattiḥ* of Bharata should be explained as *utpatti* or *pustī* . . . the permanent mood is directly connected with the hero . . ., but it is recognized as existing in the actor through a clever imitation of the original character. The *Rasa*, therefore, resides in the hero.²³

At the center of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's theory is that "the actor fancies himself as identical with the dramatic character and as a result is infected by the same feelings as he";²⁴ this actor, according to Lollaṭa, "feels the different *bhāvas* and *rasas* as though they belonged truly, or

²¹ V. K. Chari, "The Genre Theory in Sanskrit Poetics," in *Literary India: Comparative Studies in Aesthetics, Colonialism, and Culture*, ed. Patrick Colm Hogan and Lalita Pandit (Albany: SUNY, 1995), 67.

²² Bharat Gupt, *Dramatic Concepts Greek and Indian* (New Delhi: D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd., 1994), 264.

²³ S. K. De, *Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of the Aesthetic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 118-119.

²⁴ J. Prabhakara Sastry, "Lollaṭa's Theory of *Rasa*," *Journal of the Oriental Institute* 15 (1965): 165.

rather, personally to him.”²⁵ Thus for Lollaṭa, the performer is he who enjoys the *rasa*, while the spectator of the performance is but a voyeur. Thence, Lollaṭa’s theory is largely discredited because of the fact that he does not address *rasa* from the perspective of the audience of the drama; Gerow explains also that Lollaṭa’s theory is also discredited because:

It presumes a realistic determination (thus ignoring that the play is in an important sense a “fiction” whereas its “effect” is real) and more importantly is subject to the constraints of logical necessity which simply do not hold in the case of fiction, where we often have causes without effects and effects without cause.²⁶

Śaṅkuka was the next commentator on the *sūtra* of Bharata; he took exception to Lollaṭa’s theory of *rasa* and challenged Lollaṭa’s cause-effect position and sought instead to replace that version with his in which *rasa* was inferred through the mimetic efforts of the performance. Gerow explains:

Śrīśaṅkuka replaces *kāryakāraṇabhāva* (relation of cause and effect) with the familiar notion of imitation (*anukaraṇa*) according to which one may infer the *rasa* from the wholly fictive portrayal on the stage. *Rasa* is, in fact, this inference (“a state of knowing”) based on imitation.²⁷

While Gupt also provides for us the words of Śaṅkuka:

By the instrument of *vibhāvas* and the actual actions of *anubhāvas*, as well as by the complimentary *vyabhicārīs*, by the artificial efforts made by the actor, such efforts do not seem to be artificial, the *sthāyī bhāva* is inferred . . . to be located in the actor by the force of signs . . .; this *sthāyī bhāva* is an imitative rendering . . . of the *sthāyī bhāva* present in the hearts of main characters like Rāma and others. By mimetic rendering this (*sthāyī bhāva*) is known by the different name, *rasa*.²⁸

Gnoli informs us that according to Śaṅkuka, “*rasa* is not as the ‘ancients’ put it, an intensified state but an imitated state.”²⁹ As De explains, for Śaṅkuka:

²⁵ Raniero Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta*, 2d rev. ed. (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1968), 18 (Introduction).

²⁶ Jan Gonda, ed., *A History of Indian Literature*, vol. 5 Fasc. 3, *Indian Poetics*, by Edwin Gerow (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977), 265.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Bharat Gupt, *Dramatic Concepts Greek and Indian* (New Delhi: D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd., 1994), 265.

The well-trained actor so cleverly simulates the action of the hero that the spectator apprehends the actor to be identical with the hero, and *infers* from this illusion the actual feeling of the hero in his own mind, being moved by the extraordinary beauty of the represented action.”³⁰

Gupt shares with us that “on seeing the acting, the spectator can only infer what the actual *sthāyī bhāvas* of a person might have been. This knowing or inferring the actual *sthāyī bhāva* upon seeing the mimetic action is called *pratīti* by Śāṅkuka, and this *pratīti* is *rasa*.”³¹ This quality of inferential knowledge is the weakest aspect of Śāṅkuka’s theory. Subsequent commentator’s seized on this and questioned how *rasa* could be known by the experient through inference in that inference cannot convey the full effect of *rasa* as does direct cognition.

Returning to our analysis of the *rasasūtra*, the word appearing before *rasa* in the *rasasūtra* (*vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ*) is संयोगाद् *samyogād*. This term was not ‘problematized’ by commentators as was the term *niṣpattiḥ* (“produced”); *samyogād* means “conjunction, union, combination”: it is word which comprised of two words, *sam*, which is a prefix added to nouns and verbs that gives the sense of “with,” and *yogād*, which is a term being derived from the verbal root *yuj* which means, “to join.”

That which is conjoined, may be described by the term भाव *bhāva*, a term which encapsulates the initial three terms of the *sūtra*: *vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri* [*bhāva*]. The *bhāva-s* are according to Bharata called भाव *bhāva* because they “lead to the meaning of a

²⁹ Raniero Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta*, 2d rev. ed. (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1968), 19 (Introduction).

³⁰ Sushil Kumar De, *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, 2d rev. (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960), 119.

poem, a meaning which includes words, physical gestures, and emotions.”³² Bharata says that a *bhāva* “touches the heart creates *rasa*; the entire body feels the *rasa* like fire consuming a dry stick”;³³ *bhāva*-s for Bharata are that which give rise to the aesthetic configuration of *rasa*. Modern lexicographers like Apte define भाव (*bhāva*) as “Being, state of being, existence”; while Böhtlingk and Roth define it as, “*das Werden, Sein, Stattfinden*”; *bhāva* is derived from the verbal root भू (*bhū*) which means in German “*werden, entstehen, geschehen; stattfinden, dasein, sich befinden, sein.*” Modern scholars of Indian aesthetics have similar definitions: Raniero Gnoli defined *bhāva* from the root भू (*bhū*) to mean “to cause to be.” meaning, *bhāva*-s are that which caused the *rasa*-s to be: Gnoli includes a secondary meaning, “to pervade,” because the *rasa*-s pervade, as a smell does, the mind of the spectator of the drama; Basant Jaitly writes that a *bhāva* is “born of feeling . . . it is related to the mind. Mind may be taken as an executive power of the soul and *Bhāva* is described as the agitation or *vikāra* of the mind”;³⁴ Gupt explains that a *bhāva* is “a state of being, becoming, a way of feeling or thinking, sentiment, purport of intention”;³⁵ and Priyadarshi Patnaik describes a *bhāva* as being a type of “psycho-physiological state.”³⁶

Returning back to the *rasasūtra* (*vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ*) with the definition of *bhāva* in mind, the next element is व्यभिचारि *vyabhicāri*,

³¹ Bharat Gupt, *Dramatic Concepts Greek and Indian* (New Delhi: D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd., 1994), 265.

³² Bharata. *The Nāṭyaśāstra*, trans. Adya Rangacharya (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1996), 64.

³³ Ibid., 65.

³⁴ Basant Jaitly, “Bhāva in Sanskrit Poetics: A Historiette,” in *Principles of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969), 102.

³⁵ Bharat Gupt, *Dramatic Concepts Greek and Indian* (New Delhi: D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd., 1994), 252.

this term refers to the thirty three *vyabhicāri-bhāva*-s listed by Bharata in the seventh chapter of the *Nṣ*. The *vyabhicāribhāva*-s are the various and numerous fleeting emotions which simultaneously exist in a variety of combinations at certain times with a स्थायिभाव *sthāyibhāva*, which is considered as a permanent and stable emotion that endures while it is intermingled with these transient emotions (*vyabhicāribhāva*-s) which enable the permanent emotion to be 'produced' into the aesthetic configuration of *rasa*. The *vyabhicāribhāva*-s listed by Bharata in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* are:

1. निर्वेद *Nirveda*. Williams defines *nirveda* as, "not having the Vedas, infidel, unscriptural"; in this context *nirveda* means "disgust, discouragement, self-disparagement, depression, shame having a complete indifference to worldly objects."
2. ग्लानि *Glāni*. This word stems from the verbal root *glai*, which means "to feel aversion or dislike"; *glāni* in this context means "languor."
3. शङ्का *Śaṅkā*. This word stems from the verbal root *śaṅk*, which means "to be anxious, to doubt, to be suspicious"; *śaṅkā* in this context means "suspicion."
4. आसुया *Āsuyā*. This word stems from the verbal root *sūc*, which means "to point out, reveal, betray, denounce"; in this context *āsuyā* means "envy."
5. मद *Mada*. This word stems from the verbal root *mad*, which means "to be drunk; to rejoice, be glad, exult"; in this context *mada* means "intoxication."
6. श्रम *Śrama*. This word stems from the verbal root *sram*, which means "to exert oneself, to be wearied, fatigued"; in this context *srama* means "fatigue."
7. आलस्य *Ālasya*. This word stems from the verbal root *ālamb*, which means "to hang on, rest on"; in this context *ālasya* means "laziness."
8. दैन्य *Dainya*. This word stems from the verbal root *dī*, which means "to decay, perish"; in this context *dainya* means "misery."
9. चिन्ता *Cintā*. This word stems from the verbal root *cint*, which means "to think, consider, ponder"; in this context *cintā* means "anxiety."

³⁶ Priyadarshi Patnaik, *Rasa in Aesthetics: An Application of Rasa Theory to Modern Western Literature*, with a foreword by K. Krishnamoorthy (New Delhi: D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd., 1997), 7.

10. मोह *Moha*. This word stems from the verbal root *muḥ*, which means “to faint, loss consciousness”; in this context *moha* is the nominal form of the verb, “fainting.”
11. स्मृति *Smṛti*. This word stems from the verbal root *smṛ*, which means “to remember”; in this context *smṛti* is the nominal form of the verb, “memory.”
12. धृति *Dhṛti*. This word stems from the verbal root *dhṛ*, which means “to hold, bear, carry, preserve”; to exist, survive; in this context *dhṛ* means “fortitude.”
13. व्रीडा *Vṛidā*. This word stems from the verbal root *vṛiḍ*, which means “to be ashamed,” and is related to *vṛi*, which means “to cover”; in this context *vṛidā* means “shame, or bashfulness.”
14. चपलता *Capalatā*. This word stems from the verbal root *kamp*, which means “to tremble, shake”; in this context *capalatā* means “nervousness.”
15. हर्ष *Harṣa*. This word stems from the verbal root *hrṣ*, which means “to be excited: to become stiff, erect; to thrill with rapture”; in this context *harṣa* means “joy,” and may especially signify a “rapture” in which the hair upon one’s skin becomes “erect.”
16. आवेग *Āvega*. This word stems from the verbal root *viḡ*, which means “to move with quick darting motion”; in this context *āvega* means “excitement.”
17. जडता *Jaḍatā*. This word stems from the verbal root *jal*, which means “to be cold, stiff, dull, or dumb”; in this context *jaḍatā* means “slothfulness.”
18. गर्व *Garva*. This word stems from the verbal root *garv*, which means “to be proud or haughty”; in this context *garva* means “pride or arrogance.”
19. विषाद *Viṣāda*. This word stems from the verbal root *viṣad*, which means “to sink down, be exhausted”; in this context *viṣāda* means “sorrow, regret, disappointment.”
20. औत्सुक्य *Autsukya*. This word stems from the verbal root *utsu* which means “to agitate, to stir up”; in this context *autsukya* means “uneasiness.”
21. निद्रा *Nidrā*. This word stems from the verbal root *drai* or *drā*, which means “to sleep”; in this context *nidrā* means “sleep.”
22. अपस्मार *Apasmāra*. This word stems from the verbal root *smṛ*, which means “to remember,” which is conjoined with the prefix *apa* which means, “away from”; in this context *apasmāra* means forgetfulness.

23. सुप्त *Supta*. This word stems from the verbal root *svap*, which means “to sleep”; in this context, *supta* seems to be the same as *nidra*, but perhaps there is a difference that is not being explained in the text or dictionaries.

24. विबोध *Vibodha*. This word stems from the verbal root *budh*, which means “to awake, to become conscious, the unfolding of the faculties”; in this context *vibodha* means awakening.

25. आमर्ष *Āmarṣa*. This word stems from the verbal root *mṛṣ*, which means “to forget.” the prefix *a*, is a negative particle, *amarṣa* then is “to not forget”; in this context *amarṣa* means “intolerance, impatience.”

26. अवहित्थम् *Avahittham*. This word means dissimulation; the verbal root for *avahittham* escapes me. I consulted a variety of sources, e.g. Böhtlingk and Roth, their entry for the term *avahitthā* is simply *Verstellung*, which means “dissimulation.” Another source defined it as a corrupted form of *a bahiḥ stha*, which meant exterior, outforth standing; in this context it means, “covering up, dissimulation.”

27. उग्रता *Ugratā*. This word stems from the verbal root *vaj*, which means “to be hard or strong”; in this context *ugratā* means “fierceness.”

28. मति *Mati*. This word stems from the verbal root *man*, which means “to think”; in this context *mati* means “understanding, judgment.”

29. व्याधा *Vyādhā*. This word stems from the verbal root *vyadh*, which means “to pierce, hurt, or strike”; in this context *vyādhā* means “physical sickness.”

30. उन्माद *Unmāda*. This word stems from the verbal root *mad*, which means “to be exhilarated,” which is then combined with the prefix *ud*, which implies “superiority in place, separation”; in this context *unmāda* means insanity.

31. मरडम् *Marāṇam*. This word stems from the verbal root *mṛ*, which means “to die”; in this context *marāṇam* means “death caused by violence or illness.”

32. त्रास *Trāsa*. This word stems from the verbal root *tras*, which means “to shake, be terrified”; in this context *trāsa* means “dread.”

33. विर्तक *Vitarka*. This word stems from the verbal root *tarka*, which means “to reason”; in this context *vitarka* means “argumentation.”

The anterior element to the word *vyabhicāri* in the *rasasūtra* (*vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṃyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ*) is अनुभाव *anubhāva*. The *anubhāva*-s are

introduced in the seventh chapter as well as the other *bhāva*-s, but are then elaborated upon at great length in subsequent chapters. Chari explains that the Sanskrit term for “behavioral expressions is *anubhāva*, which means etymologically ‘that which follows or ensues from the feeling (as its effect).’ *Anubhāva* is that which ‘makes the feeling apprehensible.’”³⁷ In Sanskrit literary criticism, one expresses one’s feelings through the implementation of अभिनय (*abhinaya*), which is a compound word in which Gupta defines *abhi* as “specially,” and *naya* as “providing”; the term means to communicate via gesticulation and expression; Gupta explains that “*anubhāva*-s are a direct result, as well as the proof, of strong emotional arousal.”³⁸ Chari quotes Abhinavagupta and writes that: ‘Expressing the emotions is leading others toward a knowledge of those emotions. Hence they (shrugs, side-long glances, knitting the eye-brows, and so forth) are at once expressions as well as the actions exhibited (*abhinayas*).’³⁹ *Abhinaya*-s are divided by Bharata into four different categories:

1) सात्त्विकाभिनय *sāttvika-abhinaya*: This word *sāttvika* stems from the word *sat*, which translates to “being, existence.” *Sāttvikābhinaya*-s are involuntary external indicators of emotions and feelings; these are also called *sāttvikabhāva*-s; these involuntary reactions to emotional stimuli are divided by Bharata into eight different categories:

a. स्तम्भ *Stambha*. This word stems from the verbal root *stambh*, which means “to fix firmly, to support, to make stiff”; in this context *stambha* means “stupefaction, standing still,” it is a scenario in which the body is ‘frozen.’

b. स्वेद *Sveda*. This word stems from the verbal root *svad*, which means “to sweat, perspire”; in this context *sveda* is sweating.

c. रोमाञ्च *Romāñca*. This word stems from the verbal root *ruh*, which means “to grow, spring up, shoot forth”; in this context *romāñca* means “feeling thrilled, extremely excited.”

d. स्वरभेद *Svarabheda*. This word stems from the verbal root *svan*, which means “to sound, to make noise”; *bheda* is the suffix affixed to the root, it means breaking, dividing, it is

³⁷ V. K. Chari, *Sanskrit Criticism* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1990), 50.

³⁸ Bharat Gupta, *Dramatic Concepts Greek and Indian* (New Delhi: D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd., 1994), 255.

³⁹ Ibid., 51.

verbal root is *bhid*, which means “to divide or cut into parts”; in this context *svarabheda* means a break in voice.

e. वेपथु *Vepathu*. This word stems from the verbal root *vip*, which means “to tremble, shake”; in this context *vepathu* means to tremble.

f. वैवर्ण्य *Vaivarnya*. This word stems from the verbal root *varṇ*, which means “to be colored”; while the prefix *vai* is a particle affixed to suggest affirmation; in this context *vaivarnya* means the change in color of a person’s face, e.g., “to become pale.”

g. अश्रु *Aśru*. This word is the nominal form of the verb *aśru*, which means “to be affected by tears, the flowing of tears”; in this context *aśru* means tears.

h. प्रलय *Pralaya*. This word stems from the verbal root *li*, which means “to melt, liquefy, dissolve”; the prefix *pra* is affixed to the stem, it means before, forward; in this context *pralaya* means “death, to swoon.”

2) आङ्गिकाभिनय *āṅgika-abhinaya*: *Āṅgika* in Sanskrit denotes “the body, having limbs or parts; *āṅgika-abhinaya* is the conveyance of the emotions via movement of the head, torso, and limbs; within *āṅgikābhinaya* there are three ways of communication:

- a. through body stances;
- b. through facial expressions;
- c. through movements.

- Gupt explains and provides for us a taste of the text’s complexity; he writes that:

The human figure is divided up into 6 major and minor parts. Head, hands, breast, sides, hips, and legs are the major parts and eyes, brows, nose, lips, cheeks, and chin are the minor ones. . . . The head-work, itself, is a conglomerate of 36 eye movements (*dr̥tis*), 9 pupil movements (*tārākarma*), 8 ways of looking (*darśana*), 9 lip gestures (*puṭakarma*), 7 brow actions (*bhṛkuṭi*), 6 nostril movements (*nāsākarma*), 6 cheek actions (*gaṇḍaka*), 6 ways of holding the chin (*cibukakarman*), 6 facial expressions (*mukhaja*), and 9 neck actions (*grīvākarma*). . . . There are twenty-two ways of holding a single hand and its fingers. . . . There are twenty-two other ways of holding the hands together. . . . 5 ways of holding the breast. . . . 3 prescriptions for holding the belly. . . . [5] hip movements. . . . The legs are divided into three parts: thighs (*ūru*), shins (*jaṅghā*), and feet (*pada*). For each . . . five kinds of positions are prescribed. . . .⁴⁰

3) वाचिकाभिनय *vācika-abhinaya*: *Vac* is the verbal root of *vācika*; *vac* means “to speak.” *Vācika-abhinaya* is conveyance of the emotions via the use of language; Gupt quotes the *Nṣ* and explains that “Words are to be rendered carefully as they are said to be the body of *nāṭya*. Body, costume, and emotive expressions are meant to render the meaning of

⁴⁰ Ibid., 107-111.

words.”⁴¹ The lines of the actor, *pāṭhya*, are spoken in either Sanskrit or Prākṛta or both. These words that are spoken are arranged into four lines, or a meter, which exhibits a certain rhythm of which there are twenty six rhythms or meters.⁴²

4) आहार्याभिनय *āhārya-abhinaya*: this is conveyance via ‘external’ aspects, viz. ornamentation and decorations; *āhāryābhinaya* is divided into of four types:

- a. *puṣṭa* (stage props): this category would include e.g. the weapons used in the drama;
- b. *alaṅkāra* (ornaments, e.g. festoons and jewelry): Gupta shares with us that all of the actors were costumed elaborately, and that even the ascetics were adorned with garlands of flowers.
- c. *aṅgaracanā* (costumes): this category includes make-up, in which the faces of the performers were painted according to their geographic origin, meaning, the northerners were light in complexion compared to those from the south;
- d. *saṁjīva* (living animals): *saṁjīva* is the term designated for anything that moves about the stage; Gupta explains there are “four legged,” “two-legged,” and “unlegged,” which refers respectively to “animals,” “humans,” and “snakes.”

We have now arrived at the last word of the analysis which is syntactically first element of the compound (*vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ*) with the word विभाव *vibhāva*. A *vibhāva* is “the cause of (the use of) words, gestures, and facial expressions.”⁴³ Gupta explains that “the actors, the dramatic situations, the environmental and seasonal background in which these channels are employed, are called *vibhāva*-s.”⁴⁴ *Vibhāva* is a technical term used in the parlance of Medieval Sanskrit literary criticism that has a particular definition that is equivalent to the everyday expression of a “cause.” But, as V. M. Kulkarni points out: “In everyday life we do not have such terms as *vibhāva*-s etc. They belong only to *kāvya* (or rather to art), not to the real life. The ancients invented this entirely new terminology to impress on our minds the basic distinction

⁴¹ Ibid., 112.

⁴² See chapter 8 of the *Nṣ* for a closer reading.

⁴³ Bharata, *The Nāṭyaśāstra*, trans. Adya Rangacharya (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1996), 64.

⁴⁴ Bharat Gupta, *Dramatic Concepts Greek and Indian* (New Delhi: D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd., 1994), 255.

between the real world and the world of drama.”⁴⁵ Gerow’s reifies Kulkarni’s statement and writes:

The love I feel for a certain woman (*bhāva*) is always personal and situationally particular) is the basis of, but not the same emotion as, the “love” I experience (along with the entire audience) while attending upon Romeo’s infatuation with Juliet. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* constructs a parallel terminology to reflect this difference, calling the *rasa* “*śṛṅgāra*,” and the *bhāva* “*rati*,” which the latter term seems to translate “sexual passion, libido,” thus marking the plain difference from the aesthetic *rasa*, It [*rasa*] is not an emotional state that is fictive-generated in the make-believe context of the drama, but, more importantly, it is one that is inherently shared and universal; it is an emotion raised to the level of communication, and therefore enjoyable.⁴⁶

Jeffrey Masson and M. V. Patwardhan explain the original meaning of *vibhāva*⁴⁷ as so understood in Bharata’s work:

These *vibhāvas* . . . enter . . . the mind of the appreciative reader (or spectator). Then by the power of the peculiar mental reflection (on the *vibhāvas* etc.), on the part of the reader and in cooperation with his appreciative attitude, the *vibhāvas* etc., become divested of their individualistic limitations and become universalized (or generalized) and *vibhāvas* like Duṣyanta and Śankuntalā lose their individualist natures as Duṣyanta and Śankuntalā stand out before us in the universal character of manhood and womanhood in general.⁴⁸

A. K. Ramunujan and Gerow define a *vibhāva* as the “conditions of the emotion, figure the background, the scene, the characterizations themselves—those aspects of the drama that are the necessary preconditions, but not sufficient causes, of the coherent emotional tone.”⁴⁹

⁴⁵ V. M. Kulkarni, “The Alaukika Nature of Rasa,” *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 75 (1994): 281-290.

⁴⁶ Edwin Gerow, “Indian Aesthetics,” in *A Companion to World Philosophies*, ed. Eliot Deutsch and Ron Bontekoe (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 316.

⁴⁷ Eventually, *vibhāva*-s are bifurcated in post-Bharata Sanskrit literary criticism: 1) *ālambana-vibhāva*, is an instrument of support, it is defined as “‘that thing, resting on which, as its object, emotions like love are born.’ This may be a person, scene, object, or thought that excites a person’s emotion and appears to him in a certain light or under a certain description”;⁴⁷ 2) *uddīpana-vibhāva*, this is the “exciting cause” as Chari phrases it; the emotion which is developed is dependent upon the object, and the development of this emotion must occur within the proper environment, which entails secondary attendants to the object which causes the emotion to arise; Chari explains that the emotion of love, in order for it to develop, certain necessary agents facilitate its blooming, e.g., “privacy, moonlight, a pleasant climate.”

⁴⁸ J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, *Śāntarasa and Abhinavagupta’s Philosophy of Aesthetics*, Bhandarkar Oriental Series 9 (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1969), 173.

⁴⁹ Edwin Gerow and A. K. Ramanujan, “Indian Poetics,” in *The Literatures of India*, Edward C. Dimock Jr. and others (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 131.

Gerow and Ramanujan illustrate the concept of a *vibhāva* for us and excerpt a passage from the first act of Kālidāsa's *Abhijñānaśakuntala*. Prior to the excerpt though, Gerow and Ramanujan explain that this first act is largely intended to delineate the conditions which will to a great extent determine the path of the romance taken by Śakuntalā and King Duṣṇanta in the drama. Despite King Duṣṇanta's absentmindedness, the king has the quality of being a great hunter, that is, he is a hunter who is skilled in the art of killing, but he also a hunter that is sensitive to the gracefulness of his prey; this *vibhāva* is established in the lines which follow:

See! there he runs
 Aye and anon his graceful neck he bends
 To cast a glance at the pursuing car;
 And dreading now the swift-descending shaft
 Contracts into itself his slender frame:
 About his path, in scattered fragments strewn,
 The half-chewed grass falls from his panting mouth:
 See! in his airy bounds he seems to fly,
 and leaves no trace upon th' elastic turf.⁵⁰

In essence then, the term *vibhāva* is exemplified in this delineated quality of the King's well-balanced character as so shown in the stanzas above; a *vibhāva* then, is a necessary precondition which sets the stage for the coherent and overall emotional tone of the drama.

Interestingly, although we have reached the final term of the *rasasūtra* (*vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ*) with the word *vibhāva*, an important subdivision of *bhāva*, called a *sthāyibhāva*, still needs to be analyzed. *Sthāyibhāva*-s are those *bhāva*-s which are referred to as the "permanent emotions." Although the *sthāyibhāva*-s of Bharata are not explicitly included in the *rasasūtra*; they are the basis of *rasa*, the basic material, the soil, if you will, from which the redolent flower of *rasa*

⁵⁰ Ibid., 131.

blooms. Gnoli writes about the *sthāyibhāva-s* and explains that these eight basic emotions are:

Inborn in man's heart. They permanently exist in the mind of every man, in the form of latent impressions (*vāsanā*) derived from actual experiences in the present life or from inherited instincts, and, as such, they are ready to emerge into his consciousness on any occasion.⁵¹

Bharata suggests the regal importance of the eight emotions via a metaphor. Bharata explains that:

Men are born with the same characteristics, with bodies and limbs which are the same with all. And yet some become leaders (lit. kings) because of family, character, education, action, skill in particular arts, etc.; while others, less intelligent, become their followers. Similarly, *vibhāva-s* and *anubhāva-s* become the followers (lit. dependents) of *Sthāyibhāva-s*. A *Sthāyibhāva* thus becomes the master of many (other *bhāva-s*). *Vyabhicārī bhāva-s* are like servants because their nature makes them depend on *Sthāyibhāva*. A king, for example, becomes famous (lit. achieves a name) though he has a big retinue (to help him), even if the latter are big by themselves. Likewise *Sthāyibhāva* alone achieves the name *rasa*.⁵²

The eight *sthāyibhāva-s* according to Bharata are:

1. रति *Rati*, or love, is derived from the verbal root रम् (*ram*) which is defined by
 - Apte as: to be pleased, or delighted;
 - Böhtlingk and Roth as: 1) *zum Stillstehen bringen, festmachen*; 2) *ergötzen*; 3) *stillstehen, ruhen; bleiben, gern bleiben bei*;
 - Monier Williams as: to stop, stay, calm, set at rest.
 - William Dwight Whitney: to make content, related to रन् (*ran*) which means to take pleasure;
 - Bharata writes and explains the *rati*: "Is produced on achievement of desire; to be acted sweetly and gracefully."⁵³
2. हास *Hāsa*, or laughter, is derived from the verbal root हस् (*has*) which is defined by
 - Böhtlingk and Roth as: 1) *lachen, auflachen*; 2) *zum Lachen bringen*;
 - Williams as: 1) to laugh, smile at, 2) to mock or ridicule. *Hāsa* may also have the connotation of the quality of "dazzling whiteness," in that when one throws one's head back to laugh, the dazzling whiteness of one's teeth are shown.

⁵¹ Raniero Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta*, 2d rev. (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1968), 16.

⁵² Bharata, *The Nāṭyaśāstra*, trans. Adya Rangacharya (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1996), 65.

⁵³ Ibid., 66.

- Bharata explains that there are two types of laughter, laughing with and laughing at, स्वगत (svagata) and परगत (paragata), or आत्मस्थ (ātmastha) and परस्थ (parastha).⁵⁴ In the *Nś* Bharata also states that laughter (*hāsa*) is “produced when others and their actions are mimicked. It is expressed by smile, gentle laughter, and a guffaw.”⁵⁵
- 3. शोक *Śoka*, or grief, is derived from the verbal root शुच् (śuc) which is defined by
 - Böhtlingk and Roth as: 1) *flammen, leuchten, strahlen; gluhén [glut], brennen* 2) *heftigen Schmerz leiden, trauern;*
 - Williams as 1) to shine, glow, burn, or gleam; 2) to suffer violent heat or pain, to bewail, lament, or regret. *Śoka*, the derivative, can also mean burning, or hot.
 - Within the category of *śoka*, Bharata in the *Nś* addresses the act of crying, there are three different varieties:
 - 1) tears of joy, with this type the actor is to have his “cheeks puffed up with joy, tears, tears flowing from the corners of the eyes, remembering the past, the body thrilling”;⁵⁶
 - 2) tears of pain, these “tears of pain are copious, loud, and accompanied by uncomfortable body movement, collapsing on the ground, and repeated lamentations”;⁵⁷
 - 3) tears of jealousy are “accompanied by throbbing lips and cheeks, by sighs and shaking of the head, side glances and knitted brows.”⁵⁸
- 4. क्रोध *Krodha*, or anger, is derived from the verbal root क्रुध् (*krudh*), which is defined by
 - Apte as: to be angry;
 - Böhtlingk and Roth as: 1) *in Zorn gerathén;*
 - Bharata describes and enumerates five type of *krodha*. The five types of anger are:
 - 1) Anger caused by an enemy, with this first type of *krodha* the actor should have “arched brows [that] are knitted, lips [that] are bitten, hands [that] are rubbed; an angry man looks at his own arms and at the enemy with the idea of freeing himself.”⁵⁹
 - 2) Anger caused by a teacher; with this type of *krodha* the actor should “be controlled by humility, with a tearful face, looking down and wiping the perspiration; the angry person should include plenty of sly gestures.”⁶⁰
 - 3) Anger caused by a loved one, with this type of *krodha* the actor should express this by “shedding tears through the corner of the eyes, by knitting [the] eye brows, by pouting (slightly) the lip.”⁶¹ These should be done naturally, with out a lot of thought.

⁵⁴ V. Raghavan, *The Number of Rasa-s*, 3rd rev. ed. (Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1975), 179.

⁵⁵ Bharata, *The Nāṭyaśāstra*, trans. Adya Rangacharya (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1996), 66.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

4) Anger caused by a servant, with this type of *krodha* the actor should act this “without showing cruelty, look at him intensely, with eyes widened, and threaten and abuse.”⁶²

5) Anger that is feigned, with this type of *krodha* the actor should express this by “being tired, trying to invent a reason, feigned anger should be acted as a subordinate to *Vīra rasa*.”⁶³

5. उत्साह *Utsāha*, or heroic energy, is a compound that conjoins the prefix उद् *ud*, which is a prefix which implies a sense of “superiority” to the verbal root सह (*sah*); this verbal root is defined by

- Apte as: to be able, to have power or energy;
- Böhtlingk and Roth as: 1) *bewältigen, gewinnen*;
- Whitney as: to prevail;
- Williams as: to endure, bear; to act with courage.
- Bharata explains that heroic energy (*utsāha*) is the characteristic of a high character in the drama and that “Vigour or Energy is to be acted to express clarity, decision, cleverness, and correct judgment.”⁶⁴

6. भय *Bhaya*, or fear, is derived from the verbal root भी (*bhī*) which is defined by

- Böhtlingk and Roth as: 1) *sich fürchten* 2) *erschocken, in Angst seiend*;
- Williams as: to fear;
- Bharata in the *Nṣ* expressed that fear (*bhaya*):
 - 1) is produced by acting out on ill-thought ideas with respect to the elders and kings, by witnessing terrifying events, and through ignorance;
 - 2) should be acted physically by the actor by trembling his body, having a dry mouth, having bulging eyes, and acting in haste with confusion;
 - 3) should be expressed by dancers by having “drooping limbs and eyes”;⁶⁵
 - 4) should be expressed with the “hands and legs shaking, standing stiff, licking the lips, and limbs drooping.”⁶⁶

7. जुगुप्सा *Jugupsā*, or disgust, is derived from the verbal root जू (*jū*) which is defined by

- Williams as: to press forward, hurry on, be quick;
- Böhtlingk and Roth as: 1) *vorwärts drängen, rege sein* 2) *rasch, behend*;
- Bharata limits this permanent emotion to females and low characters. He expects that disgust “to be acted by holding the nose, by cowering, by fanning, and doubtfully looking about.”⁶⁷

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., 67.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

8. विस्मय *Vismaya*, or wonder, is a compound comprised of the prefix वि (*vi*)⁶⁸ and the verbal root स्मि (*smi*) which is defined by

- Böhtlingk and Roth as: 1) *lächeln, verschämt lächeln, erröthen*;
- Whitney as: to smile;
- Williams as: to smile, blush, become red;
- Bharata states: “A job excellently done pleases one; and the pleasure produces amazement and fulfillment. This should be expressed by extreme joy and the hair standing on ends.”⁶⁹

With the analysis of the *sthāyibhāva*-s and the *rasasūtra* completed, I would like to bring back the *rasasūtra* in its entirety: विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसंयोगाद्रसनिष्पत्तिः (*vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ*); which, we now know means that: *rasa* is produced from (*niṣpattiḥ*) a combination (*samyogād*) of the causes of emotion (*vibhāva*-s) the effects (*anubhāva*-s), and the transitory states of mind (*vyabhicāribhāva*-s). I now would like to list the *rasa*-s in the dramaturgical sense from Bharata’s perspective. The *rasa*-s with their respective *sthāyibhāva*-s in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* are:

- 1) शृङ्गाररस *śṛṅgāra-rasa*: This is the aesthetic configuration of “love or sexual passion.”
 - The *sthāyibhāva* of *śṛṅgāra-rasa*, its corresponding permanent emotion, is *ratī*, the first *sthāyibhāva* listed. A *śṛṅgāram* in Sanskrit means “a horn; the top or a summit of a mountain.” The color dark blue and the god Viṣṇu are corresponded with this sentiment. *Śṛṅgāra-rasa* is one of the four basic *rasa*-s; the following *rasa*, *hāsyarasa*, is derived from it.
 - Raghavan shares with us that *śṛṅgāra-rasa* has always been considered as a *rasa* of men of cultivated taste and of sophisticated nature. *Śṛṅgāra-rasa* is divided into two categories:
 - a. संभोगशृङ्गार *sambhogaśṛṅgāra*, which means literally love in enjoyment, or love in union, is love in a pleasurable form; Böhtlingk and Roth define the prefix *sambhoga* as “*Genuss*,” which means “consumption”; Bharata states that the *vibhāva*-s (the stimulants) of *sambhogaśṛṅgāra* are: “the season of spring, garlands, scent (annointment), ornament and experience or by listening to, or seeing desire company, beautiful surroundings, delightful music, beautiful parks”; Bharata then states that the *anubhāva*-s (the effects of the *vibhāva*-s, e.g., garlands)

⁶⁸ Apte notes that this prefix *vi* denotes in compounds many things, e.g. greatness or intensity.

⁶⁹ Bharata, *The Nāṭyaśāstra*, trans. Adya Rangacharya (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1996), 67.

are: “loving looks, lifting eyebrows, side glances, graceful steps and gestures.”⁷⁰ The *vyabhicāribhāva*-s (the transient emotions) of this sentiment are thirty in number, excluding only three from the list, laziness, cruelty, and disgust.

b. विप्रलम्भशृङ्गार *vipralambhaśṛṅgāra*, which means literally love in frustration, or love in separation, it is love with a painful nature; *vipralambha* means literally frustration, nonfulfillment, or deception; *vipralambhaśṛṅgāra* is subdivided into four categories:

- i. अभिलाषविप्रलम्भ *abhilāṣavipralambha*, frustration in the form of yearning;
- ii. ईर्ष्याविप्रलम्भ *īrṣyāvipralambha*, frustration caused by jealousy of the woman;
- iii. विरहविप्रलम्भ *virahavipralambha*, frustration caused by the woman’s intentional separation (*viraha*) of herself from her lover;
- iv. प्रवासविप्रलम्भ *pravāsavipralambha*, frustration caused by her lover leaving the home.⁷¹

The *anubhāva*-s for this second type are: “world weariness, physical weakness, anxiety, envy, fatigue, worry, longing, dreaming, awakening, sickness, insanity, lifelessness, and death.”⁷²

2. हास्यरस *hāsyarasa*: This is the aesthetic configuration of “the comic.”

- The permanent emotion which is corresponded with *hāsyā* is *hāsa*, the second *sthāyibhāva* listed above which stemmed from the verbal root *has* (to laugh). White and the god Pramatha, which is described as an epithet of Śiva, or the attendants of Śiva are corresponded to this *rasa*.
- Bharata states that *hāsyā* is stimulated by the *vibhāva*-s of “disfigurement of dress, decoration, impudence, greediness, roguery, incoherent speech, deformed appearance, mistakes, etc.”⁷³ The modes of expression, its *anubhāva*-s are “expanded lips, nose, cheeks and wide staring and contracted eyes, sweating or red face and holding one’s side.”⁷⁴ The transient emotions which accompany *hāsyā* are “dissimulation, laziness, lassitude, sleepiness, sleep, awakening (from sleep).”⁷⁵ *Hāsyā* is of two types, the first is when one can laugh at one’s self, the other is when one makes others laugh. *Hāsyā* is divided up into six different varieties in the *Nś*:
 - a. स्मित *smita*: this is described as a “gentle laugh,” “slight smile”; this is expressed by the performers by slightly puffing their cheeks, through graceful glances, and it

⁷⁰ Ibid., 57.

⁷¹ Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 264, n. 2.

⁷² J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, *Aesthetic Rapture The Rasādhyāya of the Nāṭyaśāstra* (Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1970), 49.

⁷³ Bharata, *The Nāṭyaśāstra*, trans. Adya Rangacharya (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1996), 58.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

is done without the performers showing their teeth; it is expressed only by the high characters of the drama;

b. हसिता *hasita*: this is described as “laughter,” “smile”; this is expressed by the performers through smiles, widened eyes, with the teeth only slightly showing; it is also only expressed by high characters;

c. विहसित *vihasita*: this is described as a “broad smile,” “gentle laughter”; this is expressed by the performers through tightly shut eyes, and through gentle but hearty laughter, and the reddening of the performers face;

d. उपहसित *upahasita*: this is described as “satirical laughter,” the “laughter of ridicule”; Bharata writes: “when the nostrils are distended and when the eyes look with a squint and when the head and shoulders are bent, it is the *upahasita* of the middle characters”;⁷⁶

e. अपहसित *apahasita*: this is described as “silly laughter,” “vulgar laughter”; Bharata explains that: “The *apahasita* of the lower characters is laughing in the wrong context with tears in the eyes and head and shoulders shaking.”⁷⁷

d. अतिहसित *atihāsita*: this is described as “loud laughter,” “excessive laughter”; the modes of expression for this last category are: grabbing one’s side, tears running down the face, and loud and boisterous laughing.

3. करुणरस *karuṇarasa*: This is the aesthetic configuration of “tragedy.”

- The *sthāyibhāva* which corresponds to *karuṇarasa* is *śoka*, which is derived from the verbal root *suc*, which means “to suffer, to burn with pain.” *Karuṇa* in German is *kläglich* which means “lamentable, deplorable, sorrowful.” *Karuṇa* may be a term derived from the conjunction of the verbal root *kṛ*, which means “to do,” and *und*, which means “to wet, and to flow.” The color prescribed to *karuṇa* is “pigeon color,” “light gray” and its corresponding deity is Yama, the god of death. *Karuṇa* is not a basic *rasa*; it is derived from *raudrarasa*. It is compared to *vipralambhaśṛṅgāra*, love in separation, in that it is “intense,” meaning that it has a high degree of sweetness, *mādhurya*. Raghavan writes: “The artistic mind has always shown a partiality for pathos. It is said the sweetest of songs are often songs of sorrow.”⁷⁸
- Bharata states that the *vibhāva*-s, the stimulant causes, which would lead to the event of *karuṇarasa* would include the experiences of being cursed by someone, being separated from a loved one, being hurt, losing one’s wealth, being the recipient of acts of cruelty etc. The modes of representation, the *abhinaya*-s are crying, becoming pale, sagging limbs, forgetfulness, and sighing. The transient emotions, the *vyabhicāribhāva*-s, which accompany this aesthetic configuration are “disgust, exhaustion, anxiety, impatience, excitement, delusion, confusion, . . .”⁷⁹

4. रौद्र *raudra*: This is the aesthetic configuration of “wrath or furiousness.”

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ V. Raghavan, *The Number of Rasa-s* (Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1967), 195.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 59.

- The *sthāyibhāva* of *raudra* is *krodha*, which is derived from the verbal root *krudh*, which means “to be angry,” *krodha* was the fourth permanent emotion described. *Raudra* is the basic *rasa* from which the third *rasa*, *karuṇarasa*, came forth. The term *raudra* itself means ‘Rudra-like.’ The color of the deity corresponding to *raudra* is red, as in the color of blood, and it corresponds to the furious god Rudra. *Karuṇarasa* is derived from *raudra*, which is one of the four basic *rasa*-s. The *vibhāva*-s for *karuṇarasa* are, “anger, boldness, censure or abuses, insults, lies, provocation, harsh words, cruelty, spite, etc.”⁸⁰ The *anubhāva*-s for *karuṇarasa* are violent acts, such as hitting, slashing, biting, dragging, attacking with clubs swords, etc. The *sāttvikabhāva*-s are having red eyes, gnashing of the teeth, rubbing the palms together, biting one’s lip etc. The transient emotions, the *vyabhicāribhāva*-s are “cold-bloodedness, (animal) energy, excitement, intolerance, cruelty, . . .etc.”⁸¹

5. वीररस *vīrarasa*: This is the aesthetic configuration of “heroism.”

- The *sthāyibhāva* of *vīra* was the fifth to be described, *utsāha*, which stemmed from the verbal root *sah*, which means, “to have power, or energy.” *Vīra* is most likely a cognate of the Latin term *vīr*, which means “man,” which is the root of the word *virile*, which means “characteristics of a man; having masculine heroic strength.” The deity that is associated with this sentiment is Mahendra, which is an epithet of Rudra, and the color associated with this *rasa* is light green, or flesh-colored. It is one of the four basic *rasa*-s; *adbhutarasa* stems forth from this *rasa*. Raghavan by using characters from the *Mahābhārata* points out that there are three kinds of *vīrarasa*: “munificence, Dāna-vīra as in Karna; following the right at all costs, Dharma-vīra, as in Yudhiṣṭhira; and martial heroism, Yuddha-vīra.”⁸² Bharata explains that *vīrarasa* is normally associated with brave individuals and that:

Its *vibhāva*-s are “courage, determination, justice, chivalry, strength, bravery, brilliance, etc. Its natural emotional expressions (*anubhāva*-s) are steadfastness, fearlessness, largemindedness, skill. Its *vyabhicāribhāva*-s are understanding, self-command, self-confidence, excitement, intelligence, memory, self-consciousness, etc.”⁸³

6. भयानकरस *bhayānakarasa*: This is the aesthetic configuration of the “fearsome.”

- The *sthāyibhāva* of *bhayānaka* is *bhaya*, or fear; *bhaya* is derived from *bhī*, which means “to fear.” *Bhayānaka* is a derivative of *Bībhatsarasa*, and therefore not considered as a basic *rasa*. This *rasa* is corresponded to black, along with the deity Kāla. The *bhāva*-s associated this sentiment are:

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² V. Raghavan, *The Number of Rasa-s* (Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1967), 180.

⁸³ Bharata, *The Nāṭyaśāstra*, trans. Adya Rangacharya (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1996), 60.

“ghastly noises, seeing supernatural beings (ghosts), fear and panic due to the (cries) owls (or the howling of) jackals, going to an empty house or to a forest. . . . It should be acted out by [*anubhāva*-s] such actions as trembling of the hands and feet, darting motions of the eyes, the hair standing on end, changing facial color (i.e. going white with fear) or stuttering. Its (*vyabhicārī*) *bhāvas* are: paralysis, sweating, stuttering, horripilation,”⁸⁴

7. बीभत्सरस *bībhatsarasa*: This is the aesthetic configuration of the “disgusting.”

- The *sthāyibhāva* of *bībhatsarasa* is *jugupsā*, which is derived from the verbal root *jū*, which means “to hurry, press forward, be quick.” *Bībhatsa* is derived from the verbal root *badh*, which means, “to abhor, loathe, detest.” *Bībhatsarasa* is a primary *rasa* from which *bhayānakarasa* is derived. *Bībhatsarasa* arises within the appreciator from witnessing unpalatable events. Masson and Patwardhan explain that such an event may be understood by an example; the example which exemplifies “ugly,” would be a Brahmin with garlic⁸⁵ [on his breath]. This sentiment is associated with the color blue and the god Śiva. Masson and Patwardhan translate and explicate for us its *bhāva*-s:

“It arises from such *vibhāva*-s as discussing, hearing, or seeing what is ugly, unpleasant, unclean, and undesired. It should be acted out by contractions of the whole body . . . , facial contortions . . . , vomiting . . . spitting, violent trembling of the body . . . , and similar gestures. Its (*vyabhicārī*)-*bhāva*-s are apoplexy, agitation . . . , panic, confusion, sickness, death and the like.”⁸⁶

8. अद्भुतरस *adbhutarasa*: This is the aesthetic configuration of the “wondrous.”

- The *sthāyibhāva* of *adbhutarasa* is *vismaya*, which is derived from the verbal root *smi*, which means, “to smile.” *Adbhutarasa* is derived from the primary *vīrarasa*, the heroic. This aesthetic configuration is associated with the color yellow and the deity Brahmā. Masson and Patwardhan share with us the *bhāva*-s associated with this last *rasa*:

It arises from such *vibhāva*-s as seeing heavenly beings, gaining one’s desired object, going to a temple, a garden, or a meeting place, or (seeing) a flying chariot, a magic show, or a juggler’s show. It should be acted out by such as opening one’s eyes wide, staring, horripilation, sweat, tears, ecstatic delight, cries of ‘bravo,’ the donation of gifts, continuous cries of ‘Oh,’ “Oh,” waving the arms, nodding the head. . . waving one’s clothes or one’s fingers. Its (*vyabhicārī*)-*bhāva*-s are paralysis, tears, sweat, stuttering, horripilation, panic, flurry, lifelessness, fainting, etc.”⁸⁷

Thus ends this analysis of the *rasasūtra* with respect to the discipline of dramatic criticism.

⁸⁴ J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, *Aesthetic Rapture The Rasādhyāya of the Nāṭyaśāstra* (Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1970), 54.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 93, n. 478.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 55.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 56.

Chapter 2

Ānandavardhana and *Rasa*

From this point, I would now like to leave our discussion of *rasa* within dramatic criticism and begin an in-depth analysis of *rasa* as it is expounded upon by Ānandavardhana in the *Saḥṛdayāloka*. Essentially, Ānandavardhana in the *Saḥṛdayāloka* sought to extend Bharata's concept of eight *rasa*-s into the realm of poetry and to begin conversation on a ninth *rasa* called *śāntarasa*.

Gerow historically situates the locus of this extension as the socio-economical-political climate of Medieval Kashmir in the post-Gupta and pre-Islamic period. Gerow informs of the fact that there was a 'collapse of the stable, wealthy, and sophisticated Gupta monarchy,' and that during the time which followed this economic implosion playwrights of Sanskrit drama were deprived of their audience and their patrons. Gerow then explains that during this time:

Local kingdoms (Harṣa) rose to prominence in various regions, but the cultural stability on which this highly artificial art form depended was destroyed. . . . Dramas continued to be written, but we presume, were rarely performed, which is to say in plain language that drama was deprived of its chief distinctive characteristics, and reduced to the status of a written art. The writing of drama, deprived of the medium in which drama comes alive, came increasingly under the dominance of the poetic styles, where ornate metaphor, difficult language, and unplayable (non-dramatic) stories dominate.¹

These "poetic styles" which Gerow mentions became the new focus of the aesthetes during this time which, from K. Krishnamoorthy's position, marked a period of "growing decadence in the literary taste of poets as well as critics."² Y. S. Walimbe chronicles this period of decadence and explains that in the course of time the theory of *rasa* which was

¹ Edwin Gerow, "Indian Poetics," in *A History of Indian Literature*, vol. 5 Fasc. 3, ed. Jan Gonda (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977), 251.

engendered from the Bharata's *rasasūtra* (*vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṃyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ*) lost favor with these early poeticicians, and that Bharata's views on poetic qualities (*alaṅkāra*, also transliterated as *alaṃkāra*) in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (chapter 16-*alaṅkāra-guṇa*) predominated in their thoughts, which lead to the subordination of *rasa* to *alaṅkāra*. These aesthetes which focused upon the beauty of poetry were called *alaṅkārika*-s; they focused upon the form and structure of a poem rather than its *rasa*, its emotional content. The *alaṅkārika*-s believed that the main reason for the appeal of a poem resided within the poet's use of charming words and expressions and not in the *rasa* one experienced. Walimbe shares with us that:

The *Alaṅkārikas* revealed a typically grammarian fashioned preference for word as opposed to idea or meaning that it embodied, and then ways and means were suggested as to how this word or expression can be rendered more charming. Consequently, we find a number of authors assiduously engaged in finding out and prescribing numerous devices and decorations to beautify the "word." The figurative images, which really constitute imaginative elements of poetic genius, became more and more conventionalized and stereotyped. There was a certain stylization, and every charming face came to be compared to the moon or the lotus.³

Alaṅkāra is a derivation of the verbal root *alaṃkr*, which means, "to embellish, to adorn, ornament." K. Krishnamoorthy explains that the *alaṅkārarika*-s (poeticicians), such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhata, Vāmana, and Rudraṭa, studied poetic expressions and realized that "poetry," as a form of art, was a deviation from the realm of normal linguistic discourse. Early poeticicians⁴, such as Bhāmaha, et al., sought to examine these deviations from common parlance as modes of embellishment rather than elucidating and asserting a coherent theory on the nature of poetic expression. Krishnamoorthy writes:

² K. Krishnamoorthy, *Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka or Theory of Suggestion in Poetry* with a foreword by K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1955), 12.

³ Y. S. Walimbe, "The Theories of Rasa and Dhvani," in *Bhāratiya Vidyā* 39 (1979): 39.

Their analysis of the linguistic structure of poetry . . . went a little deeper, in as much as it brought them closer to the issue of poetic qualities (*guṇas*) arising for the first time in the creative use of language to communicate or evoke emotional feeling-shades. But they could not establish any inherent relation between an emotional state and a poetic quality, as they ended up with their analysis with the superficial view that qualities were imbedded in the structure of the phonetic-cum-semantic complex itself which was poetic language.⁵

Bhāmaha was “the oldest extant exponent of the *Alaṅkāra* school of *Poetics*”;⁶ he sought to examine the *kāvyaśarīra*, the body of a poem, the external components of poetry, viz., *alaṅkāra* (embellishment of words), *guṇa* (the good qualities in poetry), *rīti* (style), and *vṛtti* (modes of gesture and speech), rather than poetry’s soul, the inner realm. Bhāmaha states: “A lady’s face, though naturally charming, does not shine forth without adornment.”⁷ Bhāmaha in his work distinguished between the adorned and the unadorned, or the poetic expression and an ordinary expression; he explains that:

It is decoration which lends charm to the face so that it becomes appreciative to a considerable degree . . . if destitute of any *alaṅkāra*, the beautifying element, it becomes as good as an expression of a common man having nothing to do with the aesthetic delight that a poetic expression can exclusively impart. Looked at from this point of view, *Alaṅkāra*, the beautifying principle, becomes indispensable in poetry inasmuch as it goes to constitute the very essence of poetry.

The central term within Bhāmaha’s work entitled the *Kāvyaṭīkā* is *vakrokti*; M. Krishnamachariar details Bhāmaha’s subordination of *rasa* to *vakrokti* :

By *Vakrokti* Bhāmaha meant all poetic expression other than natural, that is, all adorned expression as opposed to naked. *Vakrokti*, said Bhāmaha, was the means by which the meaning was rendered assimilable or delectable; in short *Vakrokti* flashes *Rasa*. *Rasa* is therefore subordinate to *Alaṅkāra* and *Alaṅkāra* is founded upon

⁴ For the purposes of this essay, a short synopsis of Bhāmaha’s position will suffice; for further reading on the early poetics see: S. K. De’s “Sanskrit Poetics”; Edwin Gerow’s “Indian Poetics,” in J. Gonda’s “A History of Indian Literature Vol. V fasc. 3”; and P. V. Kane’s *History of Sanskrit Poetics*.

⁵ K. Krishnamoorthy, “The Conceptual Structure of ‘Dhvani’ in Ānandavardhana’s *Dhvanyāloka*,” in *India’s Intellectual Traditions* ed. D. Krishna (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research; Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987), 148.

⁶ P. V. Kane, *History of Sanskrit Poetics* 4th ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), 83.

⁷ Rajendra Nanavati, “Ultimate Principle According to the *Alaṅkāra* and *Rīti* Schools in Sanskrit Rhetorics,” in *Ultimate in Ancient Indian Thought and Discipline* ed. S. S. Dange (Bombay: University of Bombay, 1991), 221.

Vakrokti.⁸

Vakrokti is a derivation of the verbal root *vak*, or *vañk*, which means, “to be crooked, go crookedly,” while *vakrokti* with respect to Bhāmaha refers to “an unusual or striking turn of word or meaning.” Bhāmaha believed that the essence of poetry resided within *vakrokti*. Bhāmaha characterizes poetry as *vakra*, which means “crooked in disposition, cunning,” and a poet is one who possesses *pratibhā*, which means “inspiration, poetic imagination.” So one can gather that a poem, with respect to Bhāmaha, is something that will symbolize thoughts and emotions which were crafted by the poet with great imagination and skill, and above all, it contains an element of deviation from normal speech; Bhāmaha explains that: “When for some reason, the speech is made to appear as deviant from ordinary, it is called heightened speech. . . all such speech is deviant speech, and it beautifies the poetic meaning. An aspirant should strive for it, for what *alañkāra* can subsist without this, the deviant expression.”⁹ Bhāmaha asks, “The sun has set, the moon shines, the birds are returning to their nests.” What sort of poetry is this? One calls this “information.” Bhāmaha “declares that all kinds of literature . . . ‘become important only if characterized by crookedness of speech.’”¹⁰ Bhāmaha asserts that a poet can “render speech interesting or arresting not by using plenty of superlatives and exclamations but only by cleverness in words and meanings.”¹¹ Chari explains that Bhāmaha regards “‘realistic portrayal’ or naturalistic description (*svabhāvokti*) to be . . . dull and insipid without some element of surprise, some

⁸ M. Krishnamachariar, *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), 714.

⁹ Rajendra Nanavati, “Ultimate Principle According to the *Alaṅkāra* and *Rīti* Schools in Sanskrit Rhetorics,” in *Ultimate in Ancient Indian Thought and Discipline* ed. S. S. Dange (Bombay: University of Bombay, 1991), 219.

¹⁰ V. K. Chari, *Sanskrit Criticism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1990), 35.

¹¹ Ibid.

uncommon aspect, or some striking turn of expression to raise it above banality.”¹²

Abhinavagupta quotes Bhāmaha in the *Locana* and thus provides for us an example:

This is not the buzzing of a bee,
 busy in her drunken joy;
 it is the twanging of the string
 as Cupid pulls his bow.¹³

Compared to Ānandavardhana, Bhāmaha’s theories on poetry were not successful. Many criticized the work of him and the other poeticsians of this era for their fixation on the external structures and decorative features of a poem rather than its internal and emotive properties. Ānanda only accepted the main concepts expounded upon by these early poetic theorists: (*alaṃkāra* (embellishment of words), *guṇa* (the good qualities in poetry), *rīti* (style), and *vṛtti* (modes of gesture and speech) as modes to *rasa*.

With respect to the economic degradation of time as Gerow described, one may speculate and assert that these aesthetes tried to compensate in poetry for the absence of the great pomp and splendor that the art of drama exemplified, but in doing so, they actually overcompensated which resulted in an art form which had form but was devoid of content.¹⁴

However, with the coronation of King Avantivarman of the Utpala Dynasty during the ninth century of the current era things changed drastically. Through military conquests the coffers of the Kashmirian courts were replenished with treasures and the financial

¹² V. K. Chari, *Sanskrit Criticism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1990), 35.

¹³ Abhinavagupta, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 146.

¹⁴ I think this period of literary criticism in India parallels, to a certain extent, the Rococo and/or the Impressionist movement in France during the 19th century, and then with Ānandavardhana the subsequent period of German Expressionism in which the deep inner recessives of the emotions were the focus, rather than the external qualities of the world. For more on the German Expressionists’ purpose see *Abstraction and Empathy* by Wilhelm Worringer.

stability returned and thus so did the patronage of the arts. Ingalls explains that King Avantivarman supported four poets within his court: Mukṭakaṇa, whose works are lost; Śivasvāmin, who wrote a Buddhist *kāvya* (poem) entitled the *Kapphiṇābhyaudaya*¹⁵; Ratnākara, who wrote the *Haraviṇaya* and the *Vakrotipāñcāśika*; and Ānandavardhana¹⁶ who wrote the poem *Devīśataka*, but who is most famous for his study on poetics called the *Sahṛdayāloka*, which is also known as the *Dhvanyāloka*.

The *Sahṛdayāloka* is a work that may be placed between 860-890 A. D.¹⁷ The *Sahṛdayāloka* is an immense collection of verse and poetic analyses which draws the reader to an understanding of *rasa*. In the *Sahṛdayāloka*, Ānandavardhana proclaimed *rasa-dhvani* to be काव्यस्यात्मा (*kāvyaśyātmā*), “die Seele der Poesie,”¹⁸ the soul of poetry; *rasadhvani* was achieved through the suggestive power of the words in a poem, rather than being conveyed through the literal meaning of the words of the poem. Ānandavardhana was, unlike Bhāmaha and the earlier poetics, interested in the emotive content of a poem rather than its form and body, its soul. Ānandavardhana’s basic postulate is that the poetic ultimate may only be conveyed by the suggestive power of words.

¹⁵ For more on the confluence of Buddhism and the poetic arts during this time period see Anantal Thakur’s article: “Influence of Buddhist Logic on *Alaṃkāra Śāstra*,” in the *Journal of the Oriental Institute* 7 (June 1958): 257-261.

¹⁶ For an example of Ānanda’s poetry, one may wish to refer to the excerpts in Ingalls article: “Ānandavardhana’s *Devīśataka*” in the Ernest Bender felicitation volume (109 no. 4) of the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, pages 565-575. The *Devīśataka* is a poem comprised of 103 verses; Ingalls examines 1-16, and then verses 81-101; the title of the poem may be translated as “The Goddess’s Century”; it is classified as a *citrakāvya*, which is a type of poem which is similar to a ‘crossword puzzle.’ as Ingalls describes it, in which the secret of the poem-puzzle lies within the inner circumference of this circular shaped piece in which one may read after unraveling the intricacies of the puzzle, “The son of Nona [Ānandavardhana has thus performed his worship of the Goddess under the title of ‘The Goddess’s Century,’ as instructed in a dream, a worship unsurpassed by reason of her having been the instructress.”

¹⁷ P. V. Kane, *History of Sanskrit Poetics* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), 202.

¹⁸ Ānandavardhana, *Ānandavardhana’s Dhvanyāloka* (*Die Prinzipien Der Poetik*) trans. Hermann Jacobi; Z. D. M. G., Vols 56, 57 (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1903), 20.

The *Sahṛdayāloka* of Ānandavardhana is divided into four *udḍyota*-s (chapters)

which are then sub-divided into three parts:

- 1) the *kārikā*-s; these enumerated initial portions are concise statements which are written in verse which explain the doctrines which will be elaborated upon; in the version that I will use there are 138 *kārikā*-s¹⁹; the identity of author of the *kārikā*-s within *Sahṛdayāloka* is not certain; some attribute them to Ānanda himself, while others attribute the *kārikā*-s to an older unnamed author; but it is generally accepted today that Ānanda is the author of the *kārikā*-s, as well as the *vr̥tti*;
- 2) the *vr̥tti*-s; these are the prose passages written and based upon the *kārikā*-s; the *vr̥tti* are commentarial in nature and they develop the ideas found within the *kārikā*-s to a greater extent; the *vr̥tti*-s were written by Ānandavardhana;
- 3) the *parikara śloka*-s; these passages summarize the *vr̥tti* and reify the position stated in the respective *kārikā*; the authorship of these is also not certain, though Ānandavardhana usually takes the credit.

The primary purpose of these four *udḍyota*-s (chapters) is to enlighten the reader of the indubitable presence of the aesthetic configuration *rasa* within the words of a true poem; the meanings of poems were described as two types: *vācya* (expressed) and *pratīyamāna* (implied). In this work, Bharata's concept of *rasa* assumes a new quality in that *rasa* is now tasted by the experient through an indirect means, through an interaction with the suggestive properties of the emotionally saturated words of the poet²⁰ rather than a tasting

¹⁹ I am mostly using, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta*, which was written by Daniel H. H. Ingalls and others; it was reviewed no less than five times; please see: Kunjunni K. Raja's review in *The Adyar Library Bulletin* 55 (1991): 58-70; Hank Heifetz' review in the *Journal of Asian Studies* 51 (Feb. 1992): 190-192; W. G. Regier's review in *MLN* 107 (Dec. 1992): 1085-1087; Edwin Gerow's review in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 113 (1993): 484-487; and David L. Gitomer's review in *History of Religions* 32 (1993): 378-381.

²⁰ By "poet," I mean to convey the Sanskrit equivalent, *kavi*, which means "one who perceives." While the term *āloka*, in the title of Ānanda's work *Sahṛdaya-āloka*, is a word derived from the verbal root *ālok*, which means also means "to see, perceive," "*āloka*" in the nominal form means a "light"; and that which is to be perceived by the reader of the text, that which is enlightened for the appreciator, in a figurative sense, is the heart of the poet, which is the estuary in which the liquidity of our emotions ebb and flow. One may not, however, look into the heart of the poet directly. According to Ānandavardhana, the heart of the poet may not ever be seen through direct means; just as one uses a lamp to see things in the dark, or a mirror to see something beyond the field of direct vision, one must also indirectly look into the heart of a poet indirectly.

of the *rasa* by the appreciator²¹ through dramatic devices. This new process of savoring *rasa* through the suggestive power of words is called *vyañjanā*, and also *rasadhvani*.

Ānanda's thesis of the apprehension of the aesthetic configuration of *rasa* by the *sahṛdaya* (appreciator) through a suggestive means is an extension, a modification of ideas from two systems of Indian thought: 1) *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* (the school of Vedic exegesis)²² 2) *Vyākaraṇa* (the school of Grammatical analysis).²³

Pūrvamīmāṃsā was a school of thought that concerned itself with the development of explanations, critical interpretations of the sacrificial portions of the *Veda-s*²⁴. *Mīmāṃsā* is known as *vākyaśāstra* (the science of sentences); this science of sentences was expounded upon by the linguistic philosopher Jaimini in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra-s* sometime during the second century of the current era. K. L. Sharma explains that the basis of the *Mīmāṃsā*-s inquiry into the meaning of the *Veda-s* is centered upon two basic questions:

- (1) what is the meaning and intention of a particular word or sentence or passage? and
- (2) does this meaning and intention constitute an obligatory rule of any kind or a

²¹ By "appreciator," I mean that which is more correctly understood by the Sanskrit word, "*sahṛdaya*"; *sa* is a prefix which may mean, "like," which also conveys a feeling and understanding of "accompaniment": while *hṛdaya* is a declensional form of the Sanskrit word *hṛd*, which Böhtlingk and Roth define as "*Herz, namentlich als Sitz der Empfindungen*," and as "*das Innere des Körpers*"; while Apte defines *hṛd* as "the mind, heart"; which now allows us to define a *sahṛdaya* as a the appreciator who is "like-hearted" with respect to the poet, in that for a moment, for the duration of the aesthetic experience, both the poet and the *sahṛdaya* are able to occupy a similar seat of perception in which an intense emotional encounter at the personal level has been modified and depersonalized and thence recentered at the core of the human condition. According to Ānanda, this form of *rasa*, this middle ground upon which the heart of the *kavi* and the heart of the *sahṛdaya* meet, may only experienced by the *sahṛdaya* through the suggestive powers found within the words of a poem. This suggestive power within the medium of poetry is called *vyañjanā*, or *dhvani*.

²² For an excellent explanation of *Mīmāṃsā*, see for Jaimini p. 390-401, for Bādrāyaṇa p. 404-409, and then for a comparison p. 409-414 of Hajime Nakamura's, *A Early History of Vedānta Philosophy*.

²³ Ānandavardhana was of course influenced by the earlier poetics, but the essence of his *dhvani* theory resides within concepts from the two systems of thought stated.

²⁴ By Vedic texts, I mean the *Veda-s*. "Veda" is a summary name for the four *Veda-s* which are the sacred 'Hindu' scriptures of South Asia. The *Veda* consists of the *Rg*, which is a collection of verses of praise to deities within the Hindu pantheon; *Yajurveda*, which is a collection of prose recited at the sacrifices and rituals to the gods; the *Sāmaveda*, which is a collection of chants performed at sacrifices; and the *Arthaveda*, which is a collection of incantations. The origin and dates of these texts is uncertain and a matter of great debate.

quasi-obligatory rule of a non-obligatory matter?"²⁵

For the *Mīmāṃsā*-s, a sentence was considered as "a group of incomplete words (*sākāṅkṣa*) awaiting their completion in a context";²⁶ the words of the sentence by themselves have no independent meaning and the words of the sentence must coalesce with other words in order to achieve meaning; a sentence was thus to be considered as a whole in that the aggregation of the elements of a sentence is that which constitutes the meaning of the utterance. Sharma explains that the "hermeneutics of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* helps in bridging the gap between the familiar world we live in and the alien or strange world that we strive to understand,"²⁷ and that "*mīmāṃsā* hermeneutics is concerned with all those situations in which we encounter meanings that are not immediately understandable but require interpretive effort."²⁸

Coward reveals the structure of the *Veda*-s, their object of exegesis, and explains that the *Veda*-s consists of *mantra*-s (metrical hymns) and the *brāhmaṇa*-s (prose passages). The *brāhmaṇa*-s are then classified into two groups: 1) the first group consists of the *vidhi*-s (prescriptions, which include injunctions) and *niṣedha*-s (prohibitions), while the second group consists of 2) *arthvāda*-s (supplementary descriptions), which is then sub-divided again, this time into three sections: (a) *guṇavāda*-s (utterances which are contradicted by our experiences in the world, which if they are to be understood, they must be explained figuratively, e.g., 'the mind is a thief,' (b) *anuvāda*-s (utterances which involve the repetition of ideas already known, e.g., 'fire is the antidote of snow,' and (c)

²⁵ K. L. Sharma, "Hermeneutics in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* of Jaimini: Principles of Interpretation and Authority of *Smṛti* Texts," in *India's Intellectual Traditions*, ed. Daya Krishna (Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1987), 13.

²⁶ R. C. Pandeya, *The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1963), 77.

²⁷ K. L. Sharma, "Hermeneutics in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*," 13.

²⁸ Ibid.

bhūtārthavāda-s (utterances which deal with things which are unknown, but may be construed as true, e.g., 'Indra killed Vṛta.'²⁹ Or in tabular form, Coward's analysis of the *Veda* is as follows:

Veda-s

A. *mantra-s*

B. *brāhmaṇa-s*

1. *vidhī* and *niṣedha*

2. *arthavāda-s*

a) *guṇavāda-s*

b) *anuvāda-s*

c) *bhūtārthavāda-s*

The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-s* were concerned with the *karmakāṇḍa-s* of the *Veda*, the *brāhmaṇa-s*, and sought to attain a correct understanding of the rules given in this portion of the *Veda-s* which govern the ritualistic actions performed by the *brahmin-s* (priests) during the sacrificial ceremonies. F. Staal states that: "the reason for performing a specific ritual is stated to be the desire for a particular fruit or effect. The stock example of the *Mīmāṃsā* is: "he who desires heaven shall sacrifice with the Agniṣṭoma ritual."³⁰

Deshpande explains the dynamic which lead to the 'hermeneutic' theories of the *Mīmāṃsā*:

Ancient verses from Vedic hymns were recited in performances of ritual in later days. In this process the verses were often stripped from their original context and were generalized in terms of their ritual application (*vinīyoga*). Ideally it was expected that the ritual action being performed should fully match the contents of the Vedic verse being recited. But it is clear that only the recitation of such verses was being performed, and not an act of real linguistic communication. The real prayers from the early Vedic texts turned into incantations. The ideal expectation that the ritual action should match the contents of the recited verse presumes that the performer or reciter can and does understand the exact meaning of the recited verse. However, though the old texts were preserved by memorization, their language increasingly became more and more archaic. As the time-gap between the original compositions and the ritual utilization increased, the meaning

²⁹ Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) 24-25.

³⁰ Frits Staal, *Ritual and Mantras: Rules Without Meaning* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1996), 121.

Vedic texts became increasingly inaccessible.³¹

This “inaccessibility,” caused the *Mīmāṃsā*-s to accept a second semantic category beyond the primary meaning of an utterance (*abhidhā*) to compensate for the indeterminability of the obscure utterance. This second category of meaning may be called *lakṣaṇā* (secondary meaning). K. C. Chatterji provides for us an example of *abhidhā* (primary meaning) and *lakṣaṇā*:

When we come across the Vedic text *aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhati*, i.e., anointed pebbles are to be anointed with ghee or oil, it is *Mīmāṃsā* that comes to our help and tells us that the subsequent mention of ghee in the *arthavāda* makes it quite clear that in the present case it is ghee that has to be used as the ointment and not oil.³²

In other words, the primary meaning of the utterance (*abhidhā*) is that one must anoint the pebbles, but the substance with which one should anoint is uncertain, hence the *Mīmāṃsā*’s task is to glean the secondary meaning (*lakṣaṇā* or *abhidhāpuccha*, which means the tail of *abhidhā*) from an earlier and certain textual reference and explain to the sacrificer that the logically incomplete phrase (*ākāṅkṣā*) actually means that one must anoint the pebbles with ghee. We in the previous chapter in a slight sense used the *Mīmāṃsā*’s methodology to understand the essence of the *sūtra* in that the very important word “*sthāyibhāva*” was omitted from the *rasasūtra* (*vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ*). It was only after we located and imported the term *sthāyibhāva* from another line in the same chapter of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* that we were able to understand the full meaning of the famous phrase. The practice of supplying words that have been omitted is called *adhyāhāraṇa*, which is a derivation of the verb *hr* which means “to take, carry, bear,

³¹ Madhav M. Deshpande, “Changing Conceptions of the Veda: From Speech-Acts to Magical Sounds,” *Brahmavidya* 54 (1990): 23.

fetch”; meaning, that one must carry the missing words into the sentence for its completed meaning to arise.

Ānandavardhana acknowledges and accepts the semantic theories of the *Mīmāṃsā*-s and their linguistic categories of *abhidhā* (primary) and *lakṣaṇā* (secondary). Nevertheless, Ānandavardhana in the *Saṃdayāloka* asserts a third semantic category. This third level of meaning expounded upon by Ānandavardhana is called *vyañjanā*, the suggestive power of meaning. Ānanda writes in the *Dhvanyāloka*:

The suggested, on the other hand, is something which is found in the speech of great poets, different from the literal meaning. It is that which is well-known to sensitive readers and is separate from the known, ornamented, elements [of poetry], after they have been examined, being thus like the charm of a woman. For just as charm is a certain something in women, a feast to the eyes of the discriminating, distinct from all the parts of the body after they have been examined, just so is this [suggested] meaning.³³

The standard example of the polysemic nature of utterances is: *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*, which means “the village of cow-herders on the Ganges.” According to Ānandavardhana, the poetic utterance has three different levels of meaning:

1) *abhidheyārtha*, also known as *abhidhā*: This word is comprised of the prefix *abhi*, which with verbs expresses “to, towards,” and the verbal root *dhā*, which means, “to put or place,” while *ārtha* means, “meaning”; *abhidheyārtha* then is that which first conveys meaning. The primary meaning of the utterance is that there is a village, literally, on the river Ganges. This does not make sense in Sanskrit as it does not make sense in English if we take the meaning of the phrase literally; villages are not conventionally placed

³² Kshitish Chandra Chatterji, “The Critics of Sanskrit Grammar,” in *A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians*, ed. J. F. Staal (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1972), 295.

³³ Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 78.

on the middle of rivers, thus the insufficiency (*bādhita*) of this primary meaning engenders the secondary meaning, *lakṣaṇā*.

2) *lakṣaṇā*, also known as *lakṣyārtha*: This is the term used to describe the second level of meaning; *lakṣaṇā* is derived from the verbal root *lakṣ*, which means, “to perceive, observe; to indicate, designate indirectly”; hence, with *artha* (meaning), *lakṣyārtha* and *lakṣaṇā* translates to “that meaning which is indicated, designated indirectly.” This secondary meaning of the utterance (the village on the Ganges) calls for an implicit quality to be added to the utterance, viz., the ground upon which the village rests; with this added element, one can now understand the phrase to mean, “the village on the banks of the Ganges.” But with respect to poetry, at not normal linguistic discourse, this second level of meaning is insufficient in that poetry possesses a certain charm (*lāvanya*) in which the experient is stimulated by the suggestive qualities of words of the poem. The suggestiveness is called *dhvani*, or *vyañjanā*.

3) *vyañjanā-artha*: This new level of meaning is the semantic category posited by Ānandavardhana which revolutionized the field of Indian Poetics. This third category, which is also called *dhvani*, or *vyañjanaka*, involved the expression of emotion/s without the explicit mentioning of the emotion/s within the poem; Böhtlingk and Roth list the meaning of *vyañjanaka* as it is referred to in Poetics as, “*zu verstehen gebend, implicite aussagend*,” and locate *vyañjanaka*’s verbal root as *añj*, which means, “*ungere, salben, bestreichen, beschmieren*”; while Whitney defines *añj* as “to anoint,” and Williams as “to apply an ointment or pigment, smear with, anoint; to decorate, prepare: to honour, celebrate: to cause to appear, make clear”; with respect to our topic, this verbal root must be taken in conjunction with the word *prayojana*, which means “motive”; *prayojana* is a nominal form

of the verbal root *prayuj*, which means “to unite with”; the poet is he who possesses *prayojana*, which is a motive to unite with the *sahṛdaya* through the medium of poetry; and that which is caused to “become apparent,” is the third meaning of the utterance; hence in our utterance “the village on the Ganges,” that which is communicated through suggestion, that which is “caused to appear” is the non-literal quality of the holiness, the peacefulness, etc., of the village of cow-herders on the banks of the Ganges which thence may lead to the presence of the aesthetic configuration of *rasa*.

Bhartṛhari, from the Grammarian school of thought (*Vyakaraṇa*), was another source of great influence upon the work of Ānandavardhana. Bhartṛhari accepts the *Mīmāṃsā*’s two-fold levels of meaning (*abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*), but basically opposed the *Mīmāṃsā* practice and method of applying *adhyāharā* (the providing of omitted words) to logically incomplete sentences (*ākāṅkṣa*). Chari explains that Bhartṛhari’s basic postulate as thus:

The implications of statements . . . are understood in a general way from their own expressive power, and that the sentence is completed without having to supply the words mentally, for the word actually used cannot lead to the unuttered word nor to the unuttered meaning. . . . The listener may understand more than the sentence says about a thing or an action, from the context of an utterance.³⁴

Bhartṛhari, despite his differences with the *Mīmāṃsā*-s, was also instrumental in the development of Ānandavardhana’s aesthetic theory of *rasa* and the suggestive power of poetic words. Ānanda pays homage to the Grammarians and writes in the *Dhvanyāloka*:

The preeminent men of knowledge are the grammarians, for all the sciences rest upon grammar; and they gave the name *dhvani* to the sounds of speech that are heard. In the same manner other wise men, who know the essence of poetry, have followed the example of the grammarians by giving the title *dhvani* to that verbal entity which contains a mixture of the denotative and denoted elements and which is designated

³⁴ V. K. Chari, “The Limits of a Meaning of Sentence,” *Brahmvidyā* 54 (1990): 51.

‘ a poem.’³⁵

The basis of Bhartṛhari’s work on grammatical theory is found in the first book of the *Vākyapadīya*, or the *Trikāṇḍī*. Bhartṛhari explains: Brahman is One and that it through language “turns into a temporarily real multiplicity . . . without losing its own unitary nature.”³⁶ Bhartṛhari explains then that: “The Veda is both a means of attaining to and a reflection of That (Brahman). Though Single, the Veda has been passed down by tradition in many different ways.”³⁷ And in order to have knowledge of the unitary meaning of the Veda which has been diversified, one should study the science of grammar: “Grammar is the shortest path to attainment of the highest essence (*rasa*) of speech (*vāc*) that has become differentiated. . . . Grammar is the door to liberation, the remedy of blemishes of speech, the purifier of all branches of knowledge.”³⁸ For Bhartṛhari then, God, that which is a unified whole, is something that has taken on the appearance of multiplicity within the realm of language; the science of grammar is basically that which leads to the ‘reconstitution’ of God as a whole.

Dhvani was a term used earlier by the grammarians to denote the “sounds of speech.” Abhinavagupta points out that *dhvani* for the grammarians is like the reverberations of a pealing bell in that one hears the singular sound of the ringing of the

³⁵ Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 169.

³⁶ Bhartṛhari, “*Trikāṇḍī*,” trans. Ashok Aklujkar and Karl H. Potter in *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, ed. Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjanni Raja (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) 133.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Bhartṛhari, “*Trikāṇḍī*,” 128.

bell, but in actuality, this one sound is a series of multiple reverberations.³⁹ Bhartṛhari explains the concept of *dhvani* and illustrates the process of communication and writes:

When the speaker seeks to superimpose linguistic form onto his intended meaning, the language appears to change its nature into something else (the meaning) and to project it as sounds from the vocal organ. Thus the unchanging (*avivartamāna*) language principle appears to be changing: in other words, it manifests itself through the imperceptible pervasive *dhvani*-sounds those gross *nāda*-sounds which are articulated by the vocal organs. These gross *nāda*-sounds, though temporarily ordered in a sequence, illuminate the *sphoṭa* or mental language by constructing it and permitting it (to manifest in the temporal sequence). Thus the *sphoṭa*, though single, appears to have parts equally arranged.⁴⁰

Saroja Bhate states: “In Bhartṛhari, *sphoṭa* is basically the mental image of *dhvani* i.e., sound.”⁴¹ *Sphoṭa* is defined Böhlingk and Roth as “*der unvergängliche und unvernehmliche Bestandtheil der Laute und Wörter, der als der wahre träger bedeutung betrachtet wird*”; which has been derived from the verbal root *sphuṭ*, which means “to burst; to expand, blossom, bloom”; while Williams contextually defines *sphoṭa* as: “the eternal and imperceptible element of sounds and words and the real vehicle of the idea which bursts or flashes on the mind when a sound is uttered.” J. Brough writes:

In its nontechnical sense *sphoṭa* means simply, ‘a bursting, a splitting open,’ and it is normally defined in its linguistic sense as ‘that from which the meaning bursts forth, i.e., shines forth, in other words the word-as-expressing-a-meaning (*vācaka*). The *sphoṭa* then is simply the linguistic sign in its aspect of meaning bearer (*Bedeutungsträger*).⁴²

With respect to *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* the process of language that exists between the speaker and listener, then may be described as thus: within the mind of the speaker there exists the *sphoṭa*, the idea which one wishes to convey, this is also called *śabda*

³⁹ Abhinavagupta. *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 170.

⁴⁰ Bhartṛhari, “*Trikāṇḍī*,” 133.

⁴¹ Online personal communication 13 April 1999.

buddhisthaḥ; when one begins to speak, this unit when spoken takes on the semblance of a series of individual phonemes, these are called *śrūyamāṇavarṇa-s*. M. M. Sharma explains that these *śrūyamāṇavarṇa-s*, which are the *dhvani-s*, “can never get together to convey the corresponding meaning. What the *śrūyamāṇavarṇa-s* do is reveal (suggest) the . . . undivided word bit by bit so that the by the time the last sound of the word is heard the entire word gets revealed to convey the idea.”⁴³ From the hearer’s perspective then, this process expression is reversed and the unitary meaning is then an impression in that the listener hears a series of sounds, these sound are then reconstituted within the mind of the listener, these *dhvani-s* are impressed upon the mind of the listener as a whole; the multiplicity of the utterance is understood as a unified meaning, which is called *sphoṭa*. Coward explains that *sphoṭa* in a certain sense is dualistic in that in one sense *sphoṭa* is manifested by the uttered sounds, and in the other sense, it simultaneously reveals the inner meaning of the utterance; Coward writes that, “in a more philosophic sense, *sphoṭa* may be described as the transcendent ground in which the spoken syllables and conveyed meaning find themselves unified.”⁴⁴

For Ānandavardhana, the concepts of *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* were enticing and undoubtedly worthy of being incorporated into his theories on the nature of *rasa*. *Dhvani* is the element which suggests to the experient the *rasa* of poem. If we think back to Bharata and the *rasasūtra*, one can readily see a parallel between the elements within Bharata’s

⁴² John Brough, “General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians” in *A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians*, ed. J. F. Staal (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1972), 406.

⁴³ Mukunda Madhava Sharma, *The Dhvani Theory in Sanskrit Poetics*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies Vol. 63 (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1968), 35.

⁴⁴ Harold G. Coward, “Bhartrhari’s Dhvani: A Central Notion in Indian Aesthetics,” in *Revelation in Indian Thought* ed. Harold Coward and Krishna Sivaraman (Emeryville: Dharma Press, 1977), 67.

sūtra (*vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṃyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ*), and Bhartṛhari's concepts of *dhvani* and *sphoṭa*. There are at least three such parallels which may be illustrated:

- 1) For Bharata, there is the idea, the main theme of the drama existing within the mind of the playwright which is to be communicated to the audience. *Sthāyibhāva-s* were the matrix from which *rasa* came into existence, and the *sthāyibhāva-s* are that which are portrayed on stage. This facet of Bharata's may be corresponded to the *sphoṭa* of Bhartṛhari in that both are the stable points of origin which are then objectified through expression.
- 2) For Bharata, the theme of the drama, the *sthāyibhāva-s* are expressed and divided into a series of elements (the four *abhinaya-s*)⁴⁵ which are combined during the dramatic performance. This corresponds to the *sphoṭa* of Bhartṛhari in that it has been divided into a series of sounds spoken by the speaker which are called *dhvani-s*; *dhvani-s* are those elements which are in actuality the objectified and diversified forms of the subjective and unitary meaning within the mind of the speaker, which may then be corresponded to the four *abhinaya-s* (modes of expression) of Bharata which are originally in the form of a *sthāyibhāva*.
- 3) For Bharata, *rasa* it is that which is "produced" from the combination of the elements of the drama which is enjoyed by the experient. *Rasa* it is that which is 'reconstituted' within the mind and heart of the appreciator, which originally resided within the appreciator as a *sthāyibhāva*. This corresponds to the *sphoṭa* theory of Bhartṛhari in that *sphoṭa* is that which was once diversified, thence it is understood and reconstituted within the mind of the listener in a unified manner as is the *rasa*.

Ānandavardhana states in reference to this unified manner, unified meaning:

अर्थः सहृदयश्चाध्यः काव्यात्मा यो व्यवस्थितः ।
वाच्यप्रतीयमानाख्यौ तस्य भेदावुभौ स्मृतौ ॥ २ ॥⁴⁶

arthah sahrdayaślādhyah kāvyātmā yo vyvāsthītaḥ ।
vācypratīyamānākhyaū tasya bhedāvubhau smṛtau ॥ 2 ॥

The meaning of a poem which is essential, which is recognized as the soul of poetry by the *sahrdaya*, has two aspects: the "expressed," and the "suggested."

⁴⁵ *Abhinaya-s* are the modes of representation: 1) *sātvika* (sentiments and emotions), 2) *āṅgika* (representation with the body), 3) *vācika* (through the voice), 4) *āhārya* (make-up, costumes, lighting, etc.).

⁴⁶ *Kaumudī: Dhvanyāloka* by Ānandavardhana and *Locana* by Abhinavagupta with *Kaumudī* by Uttuṅgodaya and *Upalocana* by S. Kuppasvāmī Śāstrī. *Uddyota* One. ed. by S. Kuppaswami Sastri, T. V. R. Diksitar, and T. R. Cintamani (Madras: Kuppaswami Sastri Research Institute, 1944), 86.

The “suggested,” *pratīyamānārtha*, is divided by Ānandavardhana into three different categories; the first category is called *vastu-dhvani*. The verbal root *vas* in Sanskrit means to Williams, “to live, dwell, to stop at a place”; the nominal form *vastu* means, “the seat or place of; any really existing or abiding substance or essence.” Böhrtlingk and Roth define *vastu* as “*Ding, Gegenstand, ein reales Ding*.” *Vastudhvani* means the real-thing-suggested, it is the real meaning of the poem which lies hidden within the suggestive powers of the words employed in the poem by the poet. Ānandavardhana explains: “Thus, the first variety [viz., *vastudhvani*] is totally different than the literal sense. For sometimes where the literal meaning is an injunction, the suggested meaning takes the form of a prohibition.”⁴⁷ This first variety of *vastudhvani*, the ‘real meaning of a poem’ as a form of a prohibition is best illustrated by an example. Ānandavardhana excerpts stanzas from Hāla’s *Sattasāi*:

भम धम्मिअ वीसत्थो सो सुणओ अज्ज मारिओ देण ।
गोलाणइक्कच्छकुडङ्गवासिणा दरिअसीहेण ॥⁴⁸

Go your rounds freely, gentle monk;
the little dog is gone.
Just today from the thickets by the Godā
came a fearsome lion and killed him.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 80.

⁴⁸ Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhanāchārya* ed. Durgāprasād and Kāśīnāth Pāndurang Parab (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1935) rev. reprinted Wāsudev Laxman Śāstrī Paṇṣīkar (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1998), १९.

⁴⁹ Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 83.

Jacobi translates:

*Frommer Mann, ergehe dich nur ruhig dort;
jetz ist der (böse) Hund (der einst da war, tot, er ist) von dem wilden Löwen,
der in den Büschen am Ufer der Godāvarī haust, umgebracht.⁵⁰*

In these stanzas, Abhinavagupta in the *Locana* explains that a woman is addressing a monk. This monk normally gathers flowers near a house, but he fears the dog which sits at the house. With this fear in mind, he avoids the gnashing teeth of the dog and instead chooses to gather his flowers within the thickets along the banks of an idyllic stream. The meanings of the poem are thus:

1) The literal meaning: it assumes the form of an injunction, a warning, “*ein Gebot*.”⁵¹ The woman is warning the monk of the lion’s presence; she warns the monk that the lion has killed the dog which had previously made him shiver with fear; she warns the monk of the lion’s presence within the thickets where he now goes to pick his flowers.

2) The *vastu-dhvani* (the real-meaning-suggested): it is actually a prohibition, “*ein Verbot*,”⁵² which is ‘hidden’ within the literal meaning of the stanzas within the poem. Explanation: the woman, with respect to the literal sense, appears to be primarily taking the monk’s health and welfare into consideration. She is literally warning the monk of the lion’s presence. But in actuality, the woman is primarily interested in maintaining the secrecy and beauty of a trysting spot in which she and her beloved enjoy making love on the beds of wildflowers within the thickets; that is to say, she is prohibiting the monk, through a suggestive means, from picking the

⁵⁰ Ānandavardhana, *Ānandavardhana’s Dhvanyāloka (Die Prinzipien Der Poetik)* trans. Hermann Jacobi; Z. D. M. G., Vols 56, 57 (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1903), 24

flowers upon and around which she and her lover make love, and she prohibits the monk from their trysting spot so that she and her lover can maintain the secrecy of their affair. The real meaning, the essence of the poem, despite its outward injunctive quality is that: the monk is prohibited from the thickets.⁵³

The second variety of this first type of *dhvani*, *vastudhvani*, is contrapositive with respect to the first; Ānanda writes and then again provides an example from the *Sattasāi*:

Sometimes when the literal meaning is a prohibition, this [suggested meaning] takes the form of an injunction (or invitation) as in⁵⁴:

अत्ता एत्थ णिमज्जइ एत्थ अहं दिअसअं पलोएहि ।
मा पहिअ रत्तिअन्धअ सेज्जाए महँण मज्जहिसि ॥⁵⁵

Mother-in-law lies here, lost in sleep;
And I here; thou shouldst mark
These before it is dark.
O Traveller, blinded by night,
tumble not into our beds aright.⁵⁶

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ingalls does not include this in his analysis, but I think it is interesting to additionally address the stanza with respect to the literal object of the stanzas, the flowers. In Sanskrit, *puṣpa* means “flower, blossom”; it is derived from the verbal root *puṣ*, which means “to be nourished; to thrive, flourish, prosper.” The monk in the stanzas is an ascetic who has most like taken the vows of celibacy; he is gathering flowers for a *puja* which is a sort of religious offering to a god. *Puṣpa* (a flower) is the nominal form of the verbal root which encapsulates nourishment and potency, and flowers are sometimes compared by some to the genitalia of humans, e.g., an orchid and the genitals of a woman, or a rose and the phallus of a man. And perhaps most importantly, garlands, which are made of flowers, are one of the *vibhāva*-s (stimulant causes) of *śṛṅgāra-rasa* (the aesthetic configuration of love, sexual passion) which were prescribed by Bharata in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. In the stanzas, the monk is gather flowers for his offering. With these flowers then, he is symbolically sacrificing his sexuality in that he is collecting and harvesting these things which represent sex and sexuality and he offers the flowers to his god and reaffirms his vows of celibacy. The two lovers obviously are not interested in such an enterprise, hence she prohibits him from defoliating their trysting spot; that is to say, she prohibits him from taking away the stimulant causes and symbols of her sexual ecstasy.

⁵⁴ Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 98.

⁵⁵ Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhanāchārya* ed. Durgāprasād and Kāśināth Pāndurang Parab (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1935) rev. reprinted Wāsudev Laxman Śāstrī Paṇṣīkar (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1998), २४.

⁵⁶ Ānandavardhana, *Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka or Theory of Suggestion in Poetry* trans. K. Krishnamoorthy (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1955), 4.

Jacobi translated the verses as thus:

*Dort schläft die Schwiegermuuter, hier ich, besieh es dir
jetz bei Tageslicht, nachtblinder Wanderer, damit du (nachher)
nicht in unser Bett plumpst).*⁵⁷

And Abhinavagupta's exegesis is best, he writes:

The sprout of love has suddenly arisen in a traveler as he looks at a young woman whose husband is away from home. By means of this prohibition she gives him permission. So, what we have here is an injunction that consists in the absence of prohibition. It is not a command, setting to do that which he has not set about, for such would be insulting to her own opinion of her own charms. In keeping herewith is her hint in the word *rātryandha* ('blind at night') that he will be out of his senses with the desire that will come over him at the opportune time. As an action and its absence are self-contradictory, it is clear that the suggested sense is here different from the denoted sense.⁵⁸

The second type of *pratīyamānārtha* is called *alaṅkāra-dhvani*. In the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Bharata listed four types of *alaṅkāra*-s (figures of speech): *upamā* (comparison), *rūpaka* ('metaphor'), *dīpaka* (a figure of speech that uses a verb or an adjective with two nouns, to which the verb only applies to one of the nouns, e.g, with a broken heart and [sc. fractured] mind), and *yamaka* (alliteration). In this instance of *dhvani*, the *alaṅkāra* is that which suggests the meaning of the poem. For example:

1) *upamā-dhvani*: *Upamā* is comprised of *upa*, a preposition which denotes "to, toward" and the verbal root *mā*, which means, "to measure"; *upamā* means literally "to measure one thing by another, to compare"; *upamā* is the same as a simile. The example of *upamādhvani* (primary meaning as a suggested simile) was taken by Ānandavardhana from a poem he authored; it was called *Viṣamabāṇalīlā*:

⁵⁷ Ānandavardhana, *Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka (Die Prinzipien Der Poetik)* trans. Hermann Jacobi; Z. D. M. G., Vols 56, 57 (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1903), 24.

⁵⁸ Abhinavagupta, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 98-99.

वीराणां रमइ घुसिणरुणम्मि ण तदा पिआत्थणुच्छङ्गे ।
दिट्ठी रिउगअकुम्भत्थलम्मि जह बहलसिन्दूरे ॥^{५९}

The eyes of the warriors take not such joy
in their ladies' saffron painted breasts
as they take in the cranial lobes, painted with red minium,
of their enemies' elephants.⁶⁰

Jacobi translates:

*Der Helden Blick erfreut sich nicht so sehr
an den safrangeröteten Busenhügeln der Geliebten,
wie an den dicht mit Mennige belegten breiten Stirnbuckeln feindlicher Elephanten.*⁶¹

Abhinavagupta explains that simile is the element of primary importance within the stanzas;

he details the stanzas in the *Locana*:

Here, while there is a weighing of the inclination [of these warriors] to fondle their ornamented ladies against their emotional eagerness for an approaching battle, the eagerness for battle is [shown to be] greater. Thus the directly expressed figure of speech is contrast (*vyatireka*). But a similitude is suggested between the cranial lobes of enemy elephants, ready for battle, and the swelling breasts of their ladies. By this simile we see the esteem [of these men for battle], as if they were deriving sexual pleasure from it, and this simile effects a striking portrayal of their heroism.⁶²

The third and last variety of *pratīyamānārtha* is the most important; the first variety communicated a fact, the real-thing-suggested of the poem (*vastudhvani*); the second variety communicated the meaning via a poetic figure of expression (*alamkāradhvani* i.e.

⁵⁹ Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhanāchārya* ed. Durgāprasād and Kāśīnāth Pāndurang Parab (Bombay: Nimaya Sagar Press, 1935) rev. reprinted Wāsudev Laxmaṇ Śāstrī Paṇṣīkar (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1998), २३५.

⁶⁰ Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 335.

⁶¹ Ānandavardhana, *Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka (Die Prinzipien Der Poetik)* trans. Hermann Jacobi: Z. D. M. G., Vols 56, 57 (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1903), 63-64.

⁶² Abhinavagupta, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 335.

upamādhvani), and the last variety will convey an emotion; it is called *rasa-dhvani*. This is category of *dhvani* in which the *rasa* is suggested to the reader by the poet. In this category of *dhvani*, Bharata's *rasasūtra* must be called back into action; Bharata uttered: *vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ*, which means: *rasa* exists as a combination of the *vibhāva*-s (stimulants of emotion), the *anubhāva*-s (the objectified signs of these emotions), and the *vyabhicāribhāva*-s (transient states of mind). While the *sthāyibhāva* (permanent emotion) was the element that we imported to gather a complete understanding of the *sūtra*.

With respect to our examination and analysis of *rasadhvani*, I would first like to bring the reader's attention to the famous passage in which *karuṇarasa* is first suggested as a form of *dhvani* within Indian literature. This passage is said to be the first instance of *dhvani*. The passage is in the second chapter of the *Bāla Kānda* of the *Rāmāyaṇa*;⁶³ Vālmīki, the first Indian poet, is walking toward the Ganges with his disciple; Vālmīki has just spoken with the great sage Nārada and he is ruminating upon their most recent conversation as he walks to find a bathing spot. From the *Rāmāyaṇa*:⁶⁴

Vālmīki, the sage who controlled his senses, took his robe from his disciple's hands and walked towards the river. In the meanwhile he looked at the wide forest, appreciating nature's beauty.

Walking thus towards the river while admiring the woods, that godly sage Vālmīki saw a couple of *krauñca* birds. Those birds were moving thereabout together with no

⁶³ The *Rāmāyaṇa* an Indian Epic, circa 500 B.C. to A.D. 300. Vālmīki is its author, which is the pen name used by several different authors throughout time. It is the story of Rāmā, his wife Sītā, Rāmā's brother Lakṣmaṇa, and their life in exile and adventure. The predominant sense of the aesthetic within the epic stems forth from *śoka*, from grief.

⁶⁴ The gender of the bird that was killed in the passage was at the center of scholarly debate in the sixties. For more on this debate which lies outside the purposes of the current chapter, see G. H. Bhatt's article "Krauñcavadha in Dhvanyāloka and Kāvya-mīmāṃsā," in the *Journal of the Oriental Institute* 9 (1959): 148-151; Charlotte Vaudeville's response, "A Further Note on *Krauñca-vadha* in Dhvanyāloka and Kāvya-mīmāṃsā," in the *Journal of the Oriental Institute* 11 (1961): 122-126; and J. Masson's response to Bhatt and Vaudeville, "Who Killed Cock *Krauñca*? Abhinavagupta's Reflections on the Origin of Aesthetic Experience," in the *Journal of the Oriental Institute* 18 (1969): 207-224.

fear chirping and cooing charmingly.

Then suddenly the male bird of that couple was killed by the arrow of a hunter, who by nature is an enemy of the forest fauna and always with an evil intent for his prey. Sage Vālmiki was disturbed a lot, seeing that with his own two eyes.

The male *krauñca* bird with its wings blood-wet, fell on the ground and swirled in pain. Its female partner witnessing this cruel act lamented loudly and its wailing outcries were very piteous indeed.

Affectionate couple they were, always moving together, but gone was their togetherness. With her husband slain, that lusty winged female bird with a crested red head was left alone.

Then, that bird felled by the hunter was seen by that kind hearted sage and compassion poured out of his heart.⁶⁵

In the lines above, Vālmiki experiences the loss of what was dearest and most precious to the *krauñca* and he knows that he too has been deeply affected. He sees Niṣāda, the hunter, as the cause of his perpetual grief, his inability to attain peace. Vālmiki listened to the wailing outcries of the widowed *krauñca* and he knew that from his deep inner sense of compassion and unrest that the hunter's actions were wrong, and thence prescribes for Niṣāda with a fate much less desirable than his own in the form of a beautiful verse saturated with *dhvani*; Vālmiki says to the hunter:

मा निषाद प्रतिष्ठां त्वमगमः शाश्वतीः समाः ।
यत्क्रौञ्चमिथुनादेकमवीः काममोहितम् ॥⁶⁶

*mā niṣāda pratiṣṭhām tvamagamaḥ śāśvatiḥ samāḥ
yatkrauñcamithunādekamavadhiḥ kāmamohitam*

Oh Niṣāda, you have killed one from the pair of loving *krauñca*-s, by this deed, in the years to come, may you never find a place in which you can rest.

⁶⁵ Vālmiki, *Rāmāyaṇa*, online, Available: http://www.geocities.com/~ramayanam/bala_2.htm, 4 May 1999.

⁶⁶ 1. 2. 14 of the Baroda Critical edition, cited in Bhatt's article mentioned in the note above.

Speaking those words in that fashion made him [Vālmiki] thoughtful. He pondered over and over as to “Why was I so annoyed by seeing the falling bird and uttered thus in anguish?”

Brooding thus in his thoughts, Sage Vālmiki, the erudite, eminent scholar and the thoughtful one, questioned himself and also spoke to his disciple the following words.

The foot of this stanza is arranged very well and with well-balanced letters that sound like the notes of a stringed instrument and with a rhythmical rhyme. But it came out involuntarily when I was immersed in agony and annoyance. So it shall be called *śloka* because it evolved out of *śoka*, sorrow.⁶⁷

The “*mā Niṣāda*” utterance of Vālmiki is said to be the first instance of *dhvani*. It is suggestive of the aesthetic notion of grief (*karuṇarasa*) in that it does not explicitly mention the word grief, nor are any of the synonyms for grief implemented. It is like the examples of *vastudhvani* in that Vālmiki communicates his thoughts and feelings via the suggestive power of his words as did the mistress indirectly communicate to the monk that he was forbidden from her trysting spot in the form of a warning; it is like the words of the woman to the traveler in which she indirectly invited him to her bed in the form of a prohibition. According to Ānandavardhana, grief in its rawest form, *śoka*, is not something that one can effectively and poetically convey through direct speech. The mistress (the poet) could have directly prohibited the monk through an explicit means by saying, “You! Oh holy man! Stay the hell out of our love nest!” While the woman in the second poem could have simply said, “Oh Traveler! I am dying to have sex in my bed with you tonight.” But obviously, there is nothing poetically appealing about reading these utterances; they have no sense of charm; they are too blunt; they leave nothing for the imagination to relish, to savor. Unlike these utterances, Vālmiki poetically and effectively suggests a form of grief upon Niṣāda which casts for Niṣāda a lot worse than his own.

⁶⁷ Vālmiki, *Rāmāyaṇa*, online, Available: http://www.geocities.com/~ramayanam/bala_2.htm, 4 May 1999.

The process in which we savor *rasadhvani* is founded upon the basic principles within Bharata's *rasasūtra*, the *locus classicus* of Indian aesthetics. With respect to these basic elements within the *rasasūtra*, I would like to elaborate upon Abhinavagupta's analysis of these verses from the *Rāmāyaṇa* in the *Locana* in which he defines and corresponds the elements of the *rasasūtra* with elements from the verses:

The *sthāyibhāva* is the basic, stable, emotion foundation which is transformed into *rasa*. Ānanda says, "Grief is the basic emotion of the flavor [*rasa*] of compassion (*karuṇarasa*)."⁶⁸ *Śoka* is the *sthāyibhāva* of this passage; *śoka* was the third permanent emotion described by Bharata in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*; *śoka* is derived from the verbal root *suc*, which means, "to burn with pain, to suffer." This is the stable thing which is influenced by the *bhāva-s* and is transformed into the aesthetic configuration of *karuṇa-rasa*. The *sthāyibhāva* is that which is presented to the reader of the poem. Or in other words, the *sthāyibhāva* is the basic human emotion that is objectified in the poem by the poet who takes this basic emotion and transforms it into verse.

The *vibhāva-s* are that which the poet uses to stimulate the *rasa*. In these stanzas of Vālmīki, one of the shore birds has been killed. Bharata states that a "separation from loved ones"⁶⁹ engenders the aesthetic configuration of *karuṇarasa*; hence, the death of the bird is a stimulant cause which will lead the reader to the aesthetic savoring of *karuṇarasa*.

The *anubhāva-s* are the effects, the modes of expression prescribed by Bharata. We become intimate with these effects through the words of the poem. The *anubhāva-s*

⁶⁸ Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 114.

⁶⁹ Bharata, *The Nāṭyaśāstra*, trans. Adya Rangacharya (New Delhi: Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1996), 59.

presented to the reader by Vālmiki and ascribed to the bird who had been violently separated from its lover are thus: “weeping, lamenting, and crying loudly.”⁷⁰ The surviving *krauñca*’s weeping is the second type of weeping (*aśru*) described by Bharata; these are tears of pain and “tears of pain are copious, loud, and accompanied by uncomfortable body movement, collapsing on the ground, and repeated lamentations.”⁷¹ In the poem above, the weeping *krauñca* exemplifies Bharata’s prescription for the proper method of the expression of *śoka*.

The *vyabhicāribhāva-s* are the transient emotions. Eighteen of the thirty five listed by Bharata are evident in the passage, e.g., disgust (*nirveda*), anxiety (*cintā*), and sorrowful exhaustion (*viṣāda*) are all characteristic of the wailing bird.

Samyogād is the conjunction of the *vibhāva-s* (the death of the mate, the separation), the *anubhāva-s* (the lamentation and weeping of the surviving bird) and the *vyabhicāribhāva-s* (disgust, anxiety, sorrowful exhaustion), which is of course related to the *sthāyibhāva* (grief).

Rasa-niṣpattiḥ in Bharata’s aesthetic treatise, this meant the “production” of *rasa*. In Ānandavardhana, we have lost the inherent media of the drama, and we now know of the *rasa* through the suggestive words of a poem, viz., in the “*mā Niṣāda*” utterance. In the verses above, we can grieve with Vālmiki; we can feel the pain within the core of our being; that is to say, we can empathize in a universalized fashion with Vālmiki because of our own experiences with grief in the workaday world. Our own thoughts and feelings of grief are things which are veiled and concealed within our heart, our consciousness, and

⁷⁰ Bharata, *The Nāṭyaśāstra*, trans. Adya Rangacharya (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1996), 59.

when the suggestive words of a poem resonate within us, like the pealing of a bell, this veil is drawn aside, and for a moment, our hearts are unveiled and the tears begin to flow. The suggestive words of a poem enable us to experience the transformation of the basic human emotion of grief into a detached, depersonalized, and pleasurable form of the aesthetic, and in this particular instance, that which we experienced in the *mā Niṣāda* verses of Vālmīki is called *karuṇarasa*.

Rasadhvani, as *śṛṅgārarasa*, viz., *sambhogaśṛṅgārarasa* (love in union), is being suggested to us in the following verses by Amaru, an obscure figure whom we know best through his poems. Ingalls quotes Ānandavardhana who excerpts a passage from Amaru's oeuvre:

शुन्यं वासगृहं विलोक्य शयनादुत्थय किञ्चिच्छनै-
निद्राव्याजमुपागतस्य सुचिरं निर्वर्ण्य पत्युर्मुखम् ।
विस्त्रब्धं परिचुम्ब्य जातपुलकामालोक्य गण्डस्थलीं
लज्जानम्रमुखी प्रियेण हसता बाला चिरं चुम्बिता ॥ ⁷²

Seeing that the attendant had left the bedroom,
the young wife rose half upright from the bed
and, gazing long upon her husband's face
as he lay there feigning sleep, at last took courage
and kissed him lightly, only to discover
his feint from the rising flesh upon his cheek.
When then she hung her head in shame, her dear one
seized her, laughing, and kissed her in good earnest. ⁷³

⁷¹ Bharata, *The Nāṭyaśāstra*, trans. Adya Rangacharya (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1996), 66.

⁷² Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhanāchārya* ed. Durgāprasād and Kāśīnāth Pāndurang Parab (Bombay: Niraya Sagar Press, 1935) rev. reprinted Wāsudev Laxman Śāstrī Paṇṣīkar (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1998), २९५.

⁷³ Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 682.

Jacobi translates:

*Mit noch einem Blick auf das verlassene Schlafgemach sich sachte ein wenig im Bett aufrichtend betrachtete sie lange lange des sich schlafend stellenden Gatten Antlitz, um es dann getrost zu küssen; wie sie nun aber den Wonneshauer auf seiner Wange merkend verschämt ihr Antlitz senkte, da lachte der Geliebte und küsste land sein junges Weib.*⁷⁴

The *sthāyibhava*, the basic and permanent emotion of the passage is *rati*, which stemmed from the verbal root *ram*, which means “zum Stillstehen bringen,” and “to be pleased.” Abhinavagupta believes that all beings in this life, or in a previous life, have had an encounter with this permanent emotion; he explains in the *Locana* that:

In all creatures: gods, animals, men, and the like, there is an unbroken proclivity (*vāsanā*) toward the emotion of love (*rati*). Accordingly, there is no one who is not inclined to respond sympathetically toward it. Even an ascetic can be struck by its charm. And so it is said to be sweet. For a sweet substance, such as sugar or the like, when it comes in contact with the tongue, will immediately prove desirable to everyone, wise or foolish, healthy or sick. *Locana* 2.7⁷⁵

Rati is different than *kāma*, which means “lust.” *Kāma* is a state of sexual and physical desire. Abhinava describes the distinction between the two:

Yearning in separation is when a mutual love (*rati*) has arisen in a man and woman such that each values the other as his own life . . . when mutual love (*rati*) is absent, one can speak only of the stage of physical desire (*kāma*). *Locana* 2.12⁷⁶

In the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Bharata states that “seeing desired company [and] beautiful surroundings,” are some of those things which have the capacity to stimulate *rati* which thence leads to the aesthetic configuration of *sambhogaśṛṅgārarasa*; hence, the *vibhāva* of the poem, the stimulant of the basic emotion of *rati*, is the bedroom (*Schlafgemach*) in

⁷⁴ Ānandavardhana, *Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka (Die Prinzipien Der Poetik)* trans. Hermann Jacobi; Z. D. M. G., Vols 56, 57 (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1903), 146.

⁷⁵ Abhinavagupta, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 252.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 264.

which the two lovers find themselves alone; their privacy suggests intimacy in that once they are alone, they are able to be lustfully entwined.

The prescribed *anubhāva*-s, the effects, in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* which express *rati* included: “loving looks, lifting eyebrows, and side glances”; with respect to the woman in the poem, the *anubhāva*-s are “gazing at her husband’s face and kissing him”;⁷⁷ while the *anubhāva*-s for her lover are “laughter and kisses”;⁷⁸ while the *sāttvikabhāva*, the involuntary physical reaction which appears, is the *Wonneschauer auf seiner Wange*, that is the horripilation of her husband’s cheek, Bharata calls this *romāṇca*.

The *vyabhicāribhāva*-s for *sambhogaśṛṅgārarasa*, the transient emotions, elaborated upon by Bharata that can be applied to the poem would include the entire list, with the exceptions of laziness, cruelty, and disgust; the most distinct and suggestive *vyabhicāribhāva* would be the bride’s *vrīḍā* (shame) of being discovered by her husband. But alas, her shame will pass as time moves on and they become physically closer to one another.

The *saṃyogād* is the conjunction of the *vibhāva* (the bedroom), the *anubhāva*-s (the gazes, kisses, and laughter), and the *vyabhicāribhāva* (her shame) in which the *sthāyibhāva* of *rati* is transformed and the aesthetic configuration of *sambhogaśṛṅgāra* is thus savored by the participant through the power of the suggestiveness of the words within the poem.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

Rasadhvani is also experienced as *vīrarasa*, the aesthetic configuration of “heroism, as in the benedictory verse of Ānandavardhana’s *Dhvanyāloka*:

स्वेच्छाकेसरिणः स्वच्छस्वच्छायायासितेन्दवः ।
 त्रायन्तां वो मधुरिपोः प्रपन्नार्तिच्छिदो नखाः ॥⁷⁹
svecchākesariṇaḥ svacchasvacchāyāyāsītendavaḥ
trāyantām vo madhuripoḥ prapannārticchido nakhāḥ

Ingalls translates:

Of Madhu’s foe
 incarnate as a lion by will,
 may the claws, which put the moon to shame
 in purity and shape, by cutting off his devotee’s distress
 grant you protection.⁸⁰

Jacobi translates:

*Des kraft seines Willens löwengestaltigen Madhufeindes (Viṣṇu’s) Krallen, ob deren Lauterkeit und Schönheit der Mond sich härmt, mögen euch helfen, sie die das Leid Schutzfliehender vernichten.*⁸¹

Abhinavagupta explains that *vīrarasa* (the aesthetic configuration of the heroic) is suggested to us in these stanzas by our apprehension of the *sthāyibhāva* of *utsāha*; *utsāha* stems from the verbal root *sah*, which means, “*bewältigen, gewinnen*,” “to have power, or energy.” *Vīra* is most likely a cognate to the Latin term *vir*, which means “man,” while “virile,” means “characteristic of a man; having masculine heroic strength.”

Madhufeindes Krallen, the *nakha*-s (claws) of Nṛsiṃha are very important. Ingalls explains that in the sentence of the poem, Ānandavardhana decided to put the “claws” of

⁷⁹ *Kaumudī: Dhvanyāloka* by Ānandavardhana and *Locana* by Abhinavagupta with *Kaumudī* by Uttuṅodaya and *Upalocana* by S. Kuppasvāmī Śāstrī. *Uddyota* One. ed. by S. Kuppaswami Sastri, T. V. R. Diksitar, and T. R. Cintamani (Madras: Kuppaswami Sastri Research Institute, 1944), 14.

⁸⁰ Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 64.

⁸¹ Ānandavardhana, *Ānandavardhana’s Dhvanyāloka (Die Prinzipien Der Poetik)* trans. Hermann Jacobi; Z. D. M. G., Vols 56, 57 (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1903), 20.

Nṛsiṃha in the nominative case instead of the instrumental case, that is to say, he made the “claws” the subject of the sentence, rather than the instrument which does the action; in doing so, the extraordinary power of the claws is suggested to us; this is an instance of *vastudhvani*.⁸² Abhinava additionally explains that the moon in the poem is understood to be a new moon, a slender crescent. The purity and the shape of Nṛsiṃha’s claws, which are curved and lovely, have “shamed,” and distressed the moon because it is suggested that it appears insecure about its self while in the presence of Nṛsiṃha’s claws. Generally speaking, claws, simply and normally, are things which can cause pain, but with respect to Nṛsiṃha’s claws, the quality of beauty is suggested and thence his claws are understood as something which suggests both pleasure and pain, they are god-like. Hence, when the new moon, as a slender crescent, looks at the purity and curved shape of Nṛsiṃha’s ten claws he feels that his shape is equal to that of the claws, but he cannot, as Nṛsiṃha’s claws can, cut off the mental and physical of his devotees, and with this being so, he becomes distressed. This is an instance of *alaṅkāradhvani*, i.e., *vyatirekadhvani*.⁸³

The *vibhāva* which will lead us to *virarasa* is Viṣṇu. Ānandavardhana in writing these lines makes reference to the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. In this story, Viṣṇu wishes to come to the aid of his devotee Prahrāda who is being terrorized and tormented by the demon Hiranyakaśipu. Abhinava writes: “Hiranyakaśipu was the thorn of the three worlds, a torment to everyone, and so in reality he himself was pain in concrete form to those who

⁸² Abhinavagupta, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 46, n. 5.

⁸³ Ibid., 44-45.

come to God as their sole refuge.”⁸⁴ Hiranyakaśipu cannot be killed by a man, a god, or even an animal; hence, Viṣṇu metamorphoses into the man-lion Nṛsimha, into “Madhu’s foe.”

Viṣṇu is Prahrāda’s hero; he exemplifies *asammoha* (coolness), *adhyavasāya* (resolve), and *bala* (strength). Abhinavagupta locates and defines the *anubhāva* of the passage, the external manifestations of *utsāha* as “God, who is constantly exerting himself [on behalf of mankind],”⁸⁵ and then explains that the *vyabhicāribhāva*-s within the lines are: “*asammoha* (clarity of purpose) and *adhyavasāya* (diligent resolve).”⁸⁶ Once again, the claws are the subject of the sentence; these claws are those things which will “cut off his devotee’s distress.”

The *saṃyogād* is the conjunction of the *vibhāva* (Viṣṇu), the *anubhāva*-s (God’s constant exertion), and the *vyabhicāribhāva*-s (*asammoha* and *adhyavasāya*), which leads the experient via the suggestive power of the words to the aesthetic configuration of *vīrarasa*.

Instances of *rasadhvani* within poetry are evident within all eight of Bharata’s *rasa*-s. But for some aesthetes, eight was insufficient and they sought to establish and sanction a ninth *rasa* which was called *śāntarasa*, the aesthetic configuration of peace. For an understanding of this ninth *rasa*, we must not turn our attention toward the work of Abhinavagupta.

⁸⁴ Abhinavagupta, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 44.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 44-45 n. 4.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

Chapter 3 Abhinavagupta and *Rasa*

In this last chapter, I would like to expound upon the essence and development of Abhinavagupta's theory of *śāntarasa*.

Śāntarasa is the word used to signify the aesthetic configuration of tranquillity. The word "*śānta*" has been derived from the Sanskrit verbal root "*śam*," which Apte defines as, "to be calm, quiet or tranquil," while Böhtlingk and Roth define as "*still werden, befriedigt sein; aufhören, sich legen, erlöschen*." *Śāntarasa* rests deep within the heart of Indian aesthetics, and yet, its place within "aesthetics," is somewhat of an anomaly in that the English word "aesthetics"¹ is etymologically related to the Greek term, "*aísthesis*," or "sensation"; but the nature of *śāntarasa* is perhaps best described as being closer to the word "*an-aísthesis*," or "anaesthetic," which means literally "without sensation."

As an "anaesthetic concept," it stands in direct opposition to the other *rasa*-s. The original eight *rasa*-s of Bharata were modifications of the eight permanent emotions via the retinue of *bhāva*-s which were codified by Bharata in the *rasasūtra*. *Śāntarasa*, on the other hand, is a suppression of the personal emotions borne by phenomenal sensations; hence, its placement within the *rasasūtra* of Bharata is problematic. *Śāntarasa* is a state of 'disinterestedness.' The tasting of *śāntarasa* was asserted to be similar to the experience of realizing Brahman. Realization of Brahman is purported to be an experience that is devoid of duality and egotistical associations with phenomena. Duality and egotistical associations

¹ In the West the word *aesthetic*, in the Latin form of *aesthetic*, was first used by A. T. Baumgarten in 1750 to designate the science of knowledge of the sensuous, i.e. the science of beauty in contrast with the science of logic, the science of truth.

with phenomena are essentially the fundamental components of drama and poetry. Thus, *śāntarasa* is seemingly an aberration, an aesthetic paradox.

Abhinavagupta's theory of *śāntarasa* inevitably diminishes the inherent illogicality of the term and substantiates his thesis through concepts found within the works of Bharata, Ānandavardhana, and Bhaṭṭanāyaka. The influence of these three upon Abhinavagupta stands un-contested is widely known and exemplifies the path taken by ancient and modern scholars who have expounded upon Abhinava's theory of *rasa*, and will be explicated in the pages which follow. Prior to that though, I would like to point out that there is a text that seems to have played a relatively larger role within the development of Abhinavagupta's notion of *rasa* which has relatively gone unnoticed by the majority of authors. This text is a collection of aphorisms called the *Śivasūtra*-s.

M. S. G. Dyczkowski explains that the *Śivasūtra*-s are the first Kashmiri Śaiva work. According to the tradition, Vasugupta had a dream in which Śiva himself conveyed to Vasugupta that there was an important message for the whole of mankind on Mount Mahādeva in Kashmir. Vasugupta went to the location that Śiva had told him about and there he found a boulder in which the *Śivasūtra*-s were inscribed. The *Śivasūtra*-s, in a series of aphorisms, summarize the essentials of monistic Śaiva Yoga. The *Sivasūtra*-s are one of the foundational texts of Kashmir Śaivism which were commented on by Bhāskarācārya and others. According to M. S. G. Dyczkowski, Bhāskarācārya predates Abhinava in that Abhinavagupta quotes passages from Bhāskarācārya's *Vivekāñjana* and the *Kakṣyāstotra* in his own work.²

² Mark S. G. Dyczkowski, *The Aphorisms of Śiva: with a Commentary by Bhāskarācārya* (Varanasi: Dilip Kumar Publishers, 1991), 6 [Introduction].

The passages which predate and exemplify Abhinavagupta's theory of *śāntarasa* are as follows:

In the last section of the *Śivasūtra*-s, the Self is likened to the actor, *nartaka ātmā*, Bhāskarācārya provides the commentary:

The experienced actor, who knows about (the forms) of sentiment (*rasa*), emotive states (*bhāva*) and acting and who possess the correct state of mind (*sattva*), speech, physical appearance and dress is said to act his part well. Similarly, the Self manifests itself in accord with its own inherent nature everywhere (as every living being) by penetrating into the sentiment (*rasa*) of each emotive state (*bhāva* it express) and playfully behave accordingly. (Thus the Self) is said to be an actor because it assumes every state of being.³

An anonymous author explains further that::

Inebriated with the juice of supreme bliss, (the Self sports) in this way in the world of daily life (*vihṛti*) like an experienced actor who, knowing well the (various types) of sentiment (*rasa*), the states of being which evoke them and their semblances etc., assumes the role of a limited subject. Manifesting the sentiments and emotive states etc., that his part demands (*anukārya*) by the gestures etc., of his limbs without (however) forgetting his identity, imitating each state through the signs which express sentiment (*vibhāva*) etc., he is transported to the plane (of Being) in which he savours (the joy of the beauty of consciousness) and so acts out the cosmic drama through the activity of the senses, desiring neither to gain some desired object or avoid the undesirable. Thus he delights everywhere with the light of his own nature, his mind filled with contentment by the power of his ever persisting (*avilupta*) consciousness.⁴

The inner Self is then likened to the stage, *raṅgo antarātma*, Bhāskarācārya writes:

The Self which unfolds externally is said to be the actor; the inner Self is its internal contraction. It becomes the subtle body (*puraṣṭaka*) and so is called the stage. Here the ubiquitous Lord of Consciousness dances as it were (to the rhythm) of creation, persistence, and destruction.⁵

The anonymous commentator provides further commentary:

The stage (*raṅgo*) is where (the actor) makes his appearance (*rajyate*) with the intention of exhibiting the (delightfully) various and extensive sport of the drama (in

³ Ibid., 105.

⁴ Ibid., 106.

⁵ Ibid., 107.

which he performs). It is the inner self, the subtle body (*puryaṣṭaka*) where (the Self) assumes each of its wonderful and varied (*vicitra*) roles. Basing itself in that as a support, the conscious nature assumes (various) roles according to whether it takes up residence in the body of a man or beast etc., and by setting the senses into operation performs the five (cosmic) functions of creation (persistence, destruction, obscuration, and grace).⁶

The senses are then likened to the spectators of a drama, *prekṣakānīndriyāṇi*,

Bhāskarācārya writes:

The supreme consciousness nature is free and fully awake and the senses perform their functions by its power; like spectators (they view) the ubiquitous Lord of Consciousness here as dances and cannot obscure His true nature.⁷

The anonymous commentator speaks of *rasa* and explains the meaning of the *sūtra* further:

The conscious nature is free and makes the senses and (all else) manifest. It is the light of all things for they all shine (manifestly apparent). All this universe would be blind, dumb, and insentient were it not to draw its life from the shining (radiance) of that (light). And so the senses, enlivened by it, directly perceive, like aesthetically sensitive spectators, the inherent nature (*svarūpa* of all things) which is free of the split between subject and object and is full of the extraordinary delight the performance of the cosmic drama (inspires within). (In this way, the senses) inspire the introspective yogi with the wonder that comes from aesthetic delight (*rasa*) which is the supreme nectar (of universal consciousness). When this is missing *Khecarī* and the other energies obscure the aesthetic delight of the nectar (which flows from) the perception of oneness (*abhedaprathā*) and impel the wheel of the senses along the universal path of suffering. Thus, the true nature (*svarūpa*) of the conscious nature (that turned actor) dances, is not obscured.⁸

In these passages from the *Śivasūtra*-s which were cited above, life is equated to a drama, and a drama is equated to the Self: the Self is the actor (*nartaka ātmā*); the Self is also the inner stage (*raṅgo antarātmā*); the spectators of the drama are the senses (*prekṣakānīndriyāṇi*). For Abhinavagupta though, as will be demonstrated below, drama and poetry are only similar to the Self: the *sthāyibhāvas*, *vibhāva*-s, the *anubhāva*-s, and the *vybhicāribhāva*-s are the Self which has become manifest in the world of

⁶ Ibid., 107-08.

⁷ Ibid., 108.

phenomenality, which are then generalized and taken out of their personal contexts, and then reconstituted to their original state of tranquillity within the mind and heart of the experient in a geminal form of Self known as *śāntarasa*.

Despite the commonalties between the above two perspectives of the Self and art, Abhinavagupta does not textually admit through citations this suggested relationship between his *rasa* theory and the passages cited above from the *Śivasūtra*-s. So it is extremely difficult to say with certainty exactly where, how, and when the disciplines of aesthetics, theology, and metaphysics became intertwined within Abhinava's mind and work. A possible reason behind this uncertainty is that there is not a definite chronology from which we may examine Abhinavagupta's work. If there was an exact chronology, one could, for example, readily identify the teleology of the *śāntarasa*, but alas, the chronology of Abhinavagupta's work is in a state of disarray.

In 1963, K. C Pandey divided Abhinavagupta's oeuvre into three distinct categories, viz., the early period of "*tāntrika*," the middle period of "*ālankārika*," and the late "philosophic" period.⁹

These three categories have been cited widely and have served many authors who have written on Abhinavagupta. However, according to Ingalls, Pandey's chronology of Abhinavagupta's writings is wrong. In the "Introduction" to *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* (1990, no. 49 of the H.O.S.) Ingalls explains that Pandey believed that the first period of *tantric* studies was followed by a

⁸ Ibid., 109.

⁹ Kanti Chandra Pandey, *Abhinavagupta An Historical and Philosophical Study* (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series office, 1963), 41-43.

second period of studies in literary criticism which was then followed by the final period of studies in *pratyabhijñā*. Ingalls states that:

The linchpin of his [Pandey's] belief was a reference in the *Locana* which he believed was to the *Tantrāloka*. But this linchpin has now been broken. The reference exists only in the false reading of the *Ns* edition (p. 19) of that work.¹⁰

Ingalls explains in the footnote n. 27 p. 32 that:

The false reading is as follows: *taduttīrṇatve tu sarvam paramēśvarādvayam brahmety asmacchāstrānusāreṇa viditam tantrāloka-grantham vicāraya*. The correct reading, given by the Kashi edition, p. 67, carries a very different meaning: *taduttīrṇatve tu sarvam brahmety asmacchāstrakāreṇa na viditam tattvāloka-grantham viracayatā*. **Thus the reference is to a work of Ānanda called the *Tattvāloka*, not the *Tantrāloka* of Abhinavagupta.** The Kashi reading is substantiated by Abhinava's later reference to this *Tattvāloka* under Chapter 4, *Karikā* 5 of the *Locana* (Kashi edition p. 533, line 5 of the *Locana*): *etac ca granthakāreṇa tattvāloke vitatyoktam*.¹¹

The *Tantrāloka*, mentioned by Ingalls, is the largest work written by Abhinavagupta; Pandey explains that the *Tantrāloka* "deals exhaustively with all the matters connected with the sixty-four Āgamas. It touches upon both the ritualistic and the philosophical matters alike."¹² M. S. G. Dyczkowski writes: "It reads as an exposition of Śaivāgamic ritual and practice couched in the monistic philosophy of Kashmiri Śaivism (i.e., the Pratyabhijñā). Abhinava's aim was to bring together the major Śaivāgamic schools into that of the Trika Śaivism."¹³ Ingalls then explains that Pandey's chronology is incongruent with Abhinavagupta's intellectual interests as they are described in a passage in the *Tantrāloka* thusly:

[The author] was introduced into the forest of grammar by his father, had his mind

¹⁰ Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 32.

¹¹ Ibid., n. 27, 32.

¹² Kanti Chandra Pandey, *Abhinavagupta An Historical and Philosophical Study* (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series office, 1963), 52.

¹³ Mark S. G. Dyczkowski, *The Doctrine of Vibration* (Albany: SUNY, 1987), 10.

clarified by a few drops of the sea of logic, and, when intent on enjoying the full of *rasa* of literature, was seized with an intoxicated devotion to Śiva. Being wholly filled with that, he no longer cared for worldly pursuit, until, in order to increase his enjoyment of that devotion, he went to serve in the houses of [religious] masters. (*Tantrāloka* 37.58-9).¹⁴

Ingalls continues his analysis and topical periodization by asserting that exact placement of the first and second period of Abhinava's corpus are uncertain, i.e. literary criticism and *pratyabhijñā*; he writes: "Whether the literary studies followed or, as I should think, preceded the works on the philosophy of recognition [*Pratyabhijñā*] is not certain."¹⁵ Ingalls also explains that: "The *Tantrāloka* and *Tantrasāra* should be placed among the last of his works,"¹⁶ which in effect, renders Pandey's sense of order as obsolete.

However, the logic and method used by Ingalls to academically supplant Pandey's chronology is the very same logic and method that disposes of Ingalls' new assessment of Abhinavagupta's chronology. As demonstrated below, based upon a suggestion from Raniero Gnoli, Bettina Bäumer brings attention to the fact that Ingalls, Masson, and Patwardhan have not located the source of a verse from the *Tantrāloka* within the *Dhvanyāloka*, and doing so, Gnoli-Bäumer have inadvertently, or perhaps knowingly reinstated Pandey's chronology.

Abhinavagupta, as Bäumer points out, excerpts a passage from the *Tantrāloka* and places it in Abhinavagupta's *Dhvanyālokalocana*; Bäumer explains that in the verse from the *Tantrāloka* Abhinava quotes himself in order to illustrate an example of *vastudhvani*.

*bhāvavrāta! haṭhājjanasya hṛdayānyākramya yannartayan,
bhaṅgibhīrvividhābhirātmahṛdayaṃ pracchādya saṃkrīḍase,
yastvamāha jaḍaṃ jaḍaḃ saḥṛdayaṃ manyatvā duḥśikṣito,*

¹⁴ Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 32.

¹⁵ Ibid., 33.

¹⁶ Ibid.

manya'muṣya jaḍātmatā stutipadaṃ tvatsāmyasaṃbhāvanāt.

Oh things of this world! You take possession forcefully of the hearts of people like an actor, and you playfully hide your real self under many disguises!

Those who call you insentient are themselves insentient (stupid), believing themselves to be sensitive [*sahṛdaya*], they are not learned. I believe that their stupidity (insentience) is a praise for them, since it makes them similar to you!^{17 18}

Bäumer states that Abhinava in these verses “compares the misunderstood and despised ‘things of the world’ (*bhāvavrāta*) with a great saint (*mahāpuruṣa*) who hides his real being by behaving like a fool or an ordinary man.”¹⁹ She then provides the commentary from the *Locana* by Abhinava on these lines from the *Tantrāloka*:

Some great saint who is concealing himself among ordinary people, although he has overcome all attachment, even though he has removed the farspread darkness due to his being steeped in the light of true discrimination, he makes people gossip, without manifesting himself, therefore those very people call him a crazy man, and while he is being despised, his transcendent character (*lokattaraṃ caritam*) rather reveals itself through hints (allusion or suggestion).²⁰

Bäumer continues her exegesis of the passage from the *Tantrāloka* in the *Dhvanyāloka* and writes thus:

Pretending to be afflicted with love, he amuses the people and makes them dance according to his will. His depth, intelligence, and selfless nature are not recognized by the people, and if they call him a fool (*jaḍa*), this only shows that they are much greater fools than he. There is a play on the words *jaḍa* and *hṛdaya*, as opposites, and the two meanings of *jaḍa* as insentient (for the things) and stupid (for the person)

¹⁷ Bettina Bäumer, “The Play of the Three Worlds: The Trika Concept of *Līlā*,” in *The Gods at Play Līlā in South Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 44.

¹⁸ Ingalls provides an alternative translation:

Troop of delights, who storm the hearts of men
and make them dance in many an antic step;
concealing your own intention as you play;
men call you brute and stupid, in their ignorance
thinking themselves intelligent thereby.
That title of stupidity, I think,
if given to *them* would be honorific,
for it would seem to liken them to you.

¹⁹ Bettina Bäumer, “The Play of the Three Worlds: The Trika Concept of *Līlā*,” in *The Gods at Play Līlā in South Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 44.

²⁰ Ibid.

have to be kept in mind.²¹

Bettina Bäumer in excerpting these lines brings to her reader's attention the fact that Abhinavagupta quotes from the *Tantrāloka* in his *Dhvanyālokalocana*. But, Ingalls stated that the *Tantrāloka* should be placed among the last of his works and that either of the works on literary criticism and *pratyabhijñā* would precede the *tantric*. Hence, if Bäumer and Gnoli have a correct rendering of the *Tantrāloka*, this must mean then, contrary to Ingalls assessment, the *Tantrāloka* preceded the *Dhvanyāloka*. For how can Abhinava excerpt a passage from a work from the third period, the 'last period and most mature period,' i.e. from the future (!), for placement in either the first or second period.

With Pandey's chronology reinstated, I would now like to bring to the attention of the reader passages which are found in the *tāntrika* period which mark the early stages of Abhinavagupta's thought upon the concept of *śāntarasa*.

Pandit points out at least two occasions in the *Tantrāloka* in which Abhinavagupta philosophically justifies the utility of music and other aesthetically pleasing things to the devotee who is on the path of Self-Recognition.²² According to Abhinavagupta in the *Tantrāloka*, the sound of music can help in realizing *paśyantī* and *madhyamā*. *Paśyantī* is defined by Pandit as the finest level of speech. Pandit writes:

Paśyantī is that Self-awareness in which both I-ness and this-ness shine simultaneously. They are knit together by a relation known in philosophy as 'unity in diversity.' 'I am this' (*aham idam*) is the form of this Self-awareness. Since it beholds this-ness, it is called *paśyantī*, the beholding of Self-awareness.

Pandit defines *madhyamā* as thus:

²¹ Ibid.

²² In the *Vijñānabhairava*, music is an appropriate means to achieve Realization of one's self as Śiva; it is written: If one listens with undivided attention to the sounds of stringed and other musical instruments which on account of their (uninterrupted) succession are prolonged, he will, at the end, be absorbed in the ether of consciousness (and attain this the nature of *Bhairava*). Jaideva Singh, *The Yoga of Delight, Wonder, and Astonishment A Translation of the Vijñāna-bhairava* (Albany: SUNY, 1991), 39.

Mental speech. Ideation. Thinking. *Madhyamā* is an internal reflective manifestation of awareness (*vimarśa*) taking the form of ideas.

With respect to *paśyantī* and *madhyamā*, Abhinavagupta writes in the *Tantrāloka*:

Tatra yā svāra-sandarbhā-subhagā nāda-rūpiṇī
Sā sthūlā khalu paśyantī Varṇādyā-pravibhāgataḥ (III.237)

Yattu carmāvanaddhādi kiñcit tatraiṣe yo dhvaniḥ
Sa sphuṭāsphuṭ-rūpatvān Madhyamā sthūla-rūpiṇī (III.241)

The melodious sounds of certain sweet tunes is (actually) the gross *paśyantī* form of speech because the differentiation caused by the various letters is not present. (III.237)

The sound that is produced from leather covered instruments (drums etc.), is a gross form of *madhyamā* speech, as its verbal form becomes partly clear and remains partly obscure. (III.241)²³

Pandit then explains that Abhinavagupta in the *Tantrāloka* then advises the student to concentrate on the student on the finer aspects of speech i.e. *paśyantī* and *madhyamā* which then leads to a pure awareness called *parāvāṇī*, which is the transcendental Self-awareness of the pure and infinite I-consciousness.²⁴ Abhinava writes:

Asmin sthūlatraye yattad anusandhānamādivat
Prthak prthak tat tritayaṃ sūkṣmamityabhiśabdyate
Ṣaḍjaṃ karomi madhuraṃ vādayāmi bruve vacaḥ
Prthagevānusandhāna-trayaṃ samvedyate kila
Etasyāpi trayasyādyam yadrūpamanupādhimat
Tat param tritayaṃ tatra Śivaḥ paracidātmakaḥ (*Tantrāloka* 245-47)

The preceding mental contemplation with regard to these three types of gross speech, appearing separately as (1) 'I play the *ṣaḍja* tune,' (2) 'I sweetly beat the small drum (*tablā*),' and (3) 'I speak (outwardly),' are experienced (as the finer forms of the three gross types of speech, shining as separate entities). (These are thus the finer forms of the three types of speech). **The basic source of even these (three finer forms of speech), which is free from all impositions, is that superior trinity that shines as Śiva, the transcendental and infinite pure Consciousness.** (*Tantrāloka* III.245-

²³ B. N. Pandit, *Specific Principles of Kashmir Śaivism* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1997), 147.

²⁴ Ibid., 121.

47)²⁵

With respect to the passages above, I would like to draw a line from the concept of *paśyantī* to the concept of *śāntarasa*. Here is where I believe we may understand the theory of *śāntarasa* at an early stage within the mind of Abhinavagupta. In these passages from the *Tantrāloka*, music is said to be analogous to *paśyantī*, which suggests that *paśyantī* is a type of aesthetic emotion in that it is a simultaneous form of subjectivity and objectivity. Abhinavagupta then states that the basic source of *paśyantī* is that “superior trinity that shines as Śiva, the transcendental and infinite pure Consciousness.” Since the Self is the basic source of *paśyantī*, and *paśyantī* is analogous to music, it is logical to now assert that the basic source from which music is derived is also the Self. Thus, here lies an instance in a work on *tāntrika* in which Abhinavagupta has assigned to an ‘aesthetic emotion,’ i.e. *paśyantī*, the *sthāyibhāva* of the Self, which then makes *paśyantī* analogous to *śāntarasa*.

According to Pandey, the period of literary criticism followed the period of *tāntrika*. We can be certain of three bodies of influence which were instrumental to the development of Abhinavagupta’s theory of *rasa*:

1) Bharata’s theory of *rasa* in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Abhinava recognizes the canonical authority of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*; the *rasasūtra* is the foundation of Abhinava’s thesis. But, there is no explicit mentioning of *śāntarasa* by Bharata in certain recensions, while it is found in later interpolations. Abhinava recognizes this inconsistency and he asserts that *śāntarasa*’s inclusion as a *rasa* into later interpolations of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* is spurious. Abhinava resolves this problem of illegitimacy by asserting that Bharata was far too eloquent of an author to have explicitly stated that *śāntarasa* was indeed a *rasa*, for

²⁵ Ibid., 147.

Abhinavagupta, *śāntarasa* presence in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* was evidenced through the process of suggestion, of *dhvani*.

Most of the skepticism involved with *śāntarasa* revolves around the question of its *sthāyibhāva*, its stable base, with which it could symbiotically exist. Without a *sthāyibhāva*, *śāntarasa* is not a *rasa* in that it lies outside the realm of Bharata's *rasasūtra*. Abhinava ultimately responds to his opponents by positing that *śāntarasa* is geminally related to the Self.

2) Ānandavardhana's theory of *dhvanīrasa* within the *Dhvanyāloka* was the second influence upon Abhinavagupta's theory of *rasa*. Abhinavagupta recognizes the canonical authority of the *dhvani* theory of Ānandavardhana and he agrees with Ānanda that *śānta* should also be conveyed to the experient only through a suggestive means. Abhinavagupta is also interested in the fact that Ānandavardhana openly accepted *śāntarasa*. *Śāntarasa* was considered by Ānanda to be the predominant *rasa* of the *Mahābhārata*; with respect to this work he writes in the fourth *uddyota* of the *Dhvanyāloka*:

The *Mahābhārata*, which has the form of a didactic work although it contains poetic beauty, the great sage who was its author, by furnishing a conclusion that dismays our hearts by the miserable end of the Vṛṣṇis and Pāṇḍavas, shows that the primary aim of this work has been to produce a disenchantment with the world and that he has intended his primary subject to be liberation (*mokṣa*) from the worldly life and the *rasa* of peace.²⁶

And also in the third *uddyota*:

And the peaceful is indeed apprehended as a *rasa*. It is characterized by the full development of the happiness that comes from the dying off of desire. As has been said:

The joyful pleasure in this world
and the greater joy of pleasures found in heaven

²⁶ Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta*, trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 690-691.

are not worth a sixteenth of the joy
that comes from the dying of desire
[*Mahābhārata* 12.168.36]²⁷

3) Bhaṭṭanāyaka's theory of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* (generalization) in the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* was the third influence upon Abhinavagupta's theory of *rasa*. Despite Bhaṭṭanāyaka's differences with Ānandavardhana's theory of *dhvani*, Abhinavagupta was attracted to Bhaṭṭanāyaka's theory of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*. Bhaṭṭanāyaka also accepted the legitimacy of the concept of *śāntarasa*; he expounded upon it great detail in the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*. Bhaṭṭanāyaka's notion of *śāntarasa* is quoted by Mahimabhaṭṭa in a work from the 11th century:

Dramatic performances and the music accompanying them feed the *Rasa* in all its fullness; hence the spectator, absorbed in the tasting of this, turning inward, feels pleasure through the whole performance. Sunk into his own being, he forgets everything (pertaining to practical life). There is manifested in him that flow of inborn pleasure, from which the yogins draw their satisfaction.²⁸

In his theory of *rasa*, Bhaṭṭanāyaka focused his attention on the semantic power of words, that is, the conveyance of aesthetic emotions via the linguistic media of poetry and drama. Nāyaka also divided poetic utterances into three parts. These are:

a) *Abhidhāyakatvam*: Apte defines *abhidhā*, as “the literal power or sense of the word, *denotation* . . . the expressed meaning is that which is conveyed to the understanding by the word's denotation, for its is this अभिधा that conveys to the understanding the meaning which belongs to the word by common consent or convention”; T. R. Chintamani translates *abhidhāyakatvam* as “signification,” and writes that through *abhidhāyakatvam*

²⁷ Ibid., 520.

²⁸ Raniero Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta*, 2d rev. Ed. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Studies Vol. 62 (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1968), 26 [Introduction].

one knows the literal meaning of the work via an understanding of the meaning of the words of the art form.²⁹

b) *Bhāvakatvam*: Gnoli translates this as “generalization.” This is the most important aspect of Bhaṭṭanāyaka’s work. In this function the *bhāva*-s are presented to the experient in a generalized and universalized form which then leads to the experience of *rasa*. The specific task of *bhāvakatvam* is intended to dissolve the individualistic associations of the experient to the artistic work; that is to say that, with respect to drama, the experient is said to forget that X is the performer, Y is the stage, and that Z is the experient itself; this self-forgetfulness and ablation into the Self is the key to the realization of *rasa* for Bhaṭṭanāyaka. Nāyaka’s position is explicated with the hand of Abhinavagupta who writes:

Rasa is revealed (*bhāvyamāna*) by the special power assumed by words in poetry and drama, the power of revelation (*bhāvanā*), to be distinguished from the power of denotation (*abhidhā*), consisting of the act of generalizing the determinants, etc. This power has the faculty of suppressing the thick layer of mental stupor (*moha*) occupying our own consciousness.³⁰

Gnoli explains that:

The core of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s doctrine is precisely this concept of generalization, one of the main contributions of Indian aesthetics. The aesthetic state of consciousness, whether its material be anger, love, pain, etc., does not insert itself into the texture of everyday life but is seen and lived in complete independence of any individual interest. The images contemplated on the stage or read in poetry are seen by the man of aesthetic sensibility independently of any relationship with his ordinary life or with the life of the actor or of the hero of the poem or play, and appear, therefore, in a generalized (*sadhāraṇīkṛta*, *sādhāraṇ*) way, that is to say, universally and released from individuality.³¹

²⁹ T. R. Chintamani, “Fragments of Bhaṭṭanāyaka,” *Journal of Oriental Research* (Madras) 6 part 3 (1925): 274.

³⁰ Raniero Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience*, 45.

³¹ Raniero Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience*, 21-22 (Introduction).

This second and most important function which acts as a facilitator to *rasa* is also referred to as *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*, which Williams defines as: “belonging or applicable to many or all, general, common to all, universal,” and Böhtlingk and Roth defines as: “*gemeinsam zugehörig, gemeinschaftlich, gemeinsam, gemein*”; *bhāvakatvam* is also referred to as *bhāvanā*, which Ingalls explains is a term that Bhaṭṭanāyaka borrowed from the *Mīmāṃsā*-s, which for them the “efficacy of a Vedic command,” while for Bhaṭṭanāyaka it meant “aesthetic efficacy.”³²

c) *Bhogakatvam*: Chintamani translates this as, “revealing illumination,” and explains that this third function pertains to the experient who feels the bliss of *rasa* realization; it is also called *rasacarvanā*. This realization of *rasa* is contingent upon the “generalization,” of the emotions depicted in the poem or drama; that is to say, one does not feel the pain being portrayed as one would in the workaday world in one’s own life, one feels the pain being depicted as a form of pleasure, which is aesthetic in spirit and substance. Abhinava shares Nāyaka’s position in the *Abhinavabhāratī*:

Rasa, revealed by this power [generalization], is then enjoyed (*bhuj*) with a kind of enjoyment (*bhoga*), different from direct experience, memory, etc. This enjoyment, by virtue of its different forms of contact between the *sattva* and *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ*, is consisting of the states of fluidity (*drutī*), enlargement (*vistara*), and expansion (*vikāsa*), is characterized by a resting (*viśrāntī*) on one’s own consciousness (*saṃvit*) which due to the emergent state of *sattva*, is pervaded by beatitude (*ānanda*) and light (*prakāśa*) and is similar to the tasting (*āsvāda*) of the supreme *brahman*.³³

And also within the *Locana*:

Once a *rasa* has been thus realized, its enjoyment (*bhoga*) [is possible], an enjoyment which is different from the apprehensions derived from memory or direct experience and which takes the form of melting, expansion, and radiance. **This enjoyment is like**

³² Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 35-36.

³³ Raniero Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta*, 2d rev. Ed. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Studies Vol. 62 (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1968), 47-48.

the bliss that comes from realizing [one's identity] with the highest Brahman, for it consists of repose in the bliss which is the true nature of one's own self, and nature which is basically *sattva* but is intermingled with the diversity of *rajas* and *tamas*. It is this aesthetic pleasure (*bhoga*) alone that is the major element [i.e., the purpose of poetry] and it is something already [eternally] accomplished (*siddharūpa*).³⁴

It is this last aspect, highlighted in bold print, in which Bhaṭṭanāyaka has stated the similarity between the tasting of *rasa* to the realization of one's Self, that Abhinavagupta recognizes as his textual leitmotif for his conversation on *śāntarasa*; it is from this exact point with Bhaṭṭanāyaka, that *śāntarasa* serves as the nexus, the facilitator, in which the discipline of Indian aesthetics melts into the metaphysics and theology of Kashmir Śaivism.

We can directly learn more about this analogy between God and *rasa* from the *Śāntarasaprakaraṇa* in Abhinavagupta's commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, the *Abhinavabhāratī*, in which Abhinava sought to authoritatively sanction the presence of *śāntarasa* through the establishment of *śāntarasa*'s *sthāyibhāva*. Most of the skepticism involved with *śāntarasa* revolves around the question of its *sthāyibhāva*, its stable base, with which it could symbiotically co-exist; without a *sthāyibhāva*, *śāntarasa* is basically not a *rasa*. Thus the primary purpose of the *Abhinavabhāratī* is to demolish this skepticism.

Abhinavagupta begins his argumentation for *śāntarasa*'s place amongst the other eight *rasa*-s by discussing the position in which *śāma* (calmness) is the *sthāyibhāva* of *śāntarasa*. Those who assert *śāma* as the *sthāyibhāva* of *śāntarasa* explain that it is stimulated by *vibhāva*-s such as ascetic practice, associations with ascetics, and Vedic

³⁴ Abhinavagupta, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta*, trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 222.

recitation, and that it is expressed through the *anubhāva*-s such as the absence of desire and anger, and that it is accompanied by the *vyabhicāribhāva*-s of steadfastness, reflection, etc.

The first objection encountered and asserted by the opponents of *śāntarasa* charge that Bharata listed forty nine *bhava*-s, and *śama* is not one of the forty nine, thus there is no textual basis from which the assertion of *śama* as the *sthāyibhāva* can be substantiated within the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. His opponents then essentially take the *rasasūtra* of Bharata and post their grievances sequentially with respect to the with the phrase: the detractors begin with the *vibhāva*-s and compare the *vibhāva*-s for *śāntarasa* to the *vibhāva*-s for *śṛṅgārarasa* (the aesthetic configuration of love, the erotic) and posit that *śṛṅgārarasa*-’s *vibhāva*-s (garlands, the seasons, etc.) are affective and that one immediately becomes aroused when these stimulants are enacted, and thence, with respect to these stimulants, question the effectiveness and the ability of the *vibhāva*-s of ascetic practice, associations with ascetics, and Vedic recitation to stimulate *śāntarasa*. The opponents then question the validity of the *anubhāva*-s (the absence of desire and anger) assigned to *śāntarasa*, and assert that the cessation of activity is not something that can be actually presented on the stage in that the actor must in some way be in motion; for example, just as when one portrays sleep on stage, the chest must rise and collapse with respiration, so must there be activity with respect to the *anubhāva*-s of *śāntarasa*. The opponents then question the validity of the *vyabhicāribhāva*-s assigned to *śāntarasa*; Gerow translates:

And (as for this rasa’s supposed transitory affective states) how can such things as “steadfastness,” in which a passion for (attainable) objects is presumed, occur in (the context of) tranquillity (which, by definition, involves no passion for any object). It is not by doing nothing that the spiritual trainee [*vineya*] is educated in the means of knowing the truth; they whose minds are pained at (the spectacle of) another’s pain have not reached the condition of seeing correctly, but are (still) in worldly travail

(*samsāra*). Thus, 'tranquillity' is not a *rasa*.³⁵

Abhinavagupta responds to these objections by discussing the crucial presence of the *puruṣārtha*-s (lit., the aims of man) within the dramatic themes prescribed by Bharata. Abhinava's ultimate aim is to draw forth the fact of the co-relationship between the four *puruṣārtha*-s and the four primary *rasa*-s (*rati*, *hāsa*, *śoka*, *krodha*) sanctioned in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*.

In South Asian thought, the *puruṣārtha*-s are the principle objects of human life. The original three *puruṣārtha*-s were: *dharma* (religious duty), *artha* (well-being), and *kāma* (pleasure), to which the most important, *mokṣa* (liberation, i.e. in Abhinava's case, recognition of one's self as Śiva) was later added because of its prevalence throughout philosophical treatises. Tandra Patnaik writes:

[The] *Nāṭyaśāstra* . . . presupposes *trivarga* . . . as the basic purposes of drama, music, poetry, etc. It says: 'sometime it (drama, etc.) shows *dharma*, sometimes play [*artha*], sometimes material gain [*kāma*] and sometimes peace [*mokṣa*]' (*Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.104 and 1.108 to 1.11). This claim is supported by *Agnipurāṇa* which states: *Trivarga Sāadhanam nāṭyam* 'i.e. art-forms are meant for the realization of threefold values of human life.'³⁶

Abhinava writes of *mokṣa* in the *Tantrāloka*: मोक्षो हि नाम नैवान्यः स्वरूपप्रथनं हि तत् which Singh translates to: *Mokṣa* (liberation) is nothing but the awareness of one's true nature.³⁷

Abhinava then in his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, called the *Gītārthasaṅgraha*, which was written "side by side" with the *Abhinavabhāratī*,³⁸ describes *mokṣa*³⁹ as thus:

³⁵ Edwin Gerow, "Abhinavagupta's Aesthetics as a Speculative Paradigm," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 114 (1994): 194.

³⁶ Tandra Patnaik, "Puruṣārthas in Aesthetics," *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* 22 (1995): 55.

³⁷ Jaideva Singh, *Kṣemarāja The Doctrine of Recognition A Translation of Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam*

And verily, *mokṣa* (which is) to merge in Lord Śiva, the eternal, free from desire, who has attained to all the divisions and forms, who is omniscient, and all of whose senses, etc., are pure in nature.⁴⁰

Acquiring the proper textual sanction in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* for the motif of *mokṣa* within the arts, Abhinava thence explained that once the *bhāva*-s for *śṛṅgārarasa*, i.e. *rati* were generalized and universalized (Bhaṭṭanāyaka's principle of *sādhāraṇikaraṇa*) the aesthetic configuration of *śṛṅgārarasa* that was savored may be corresponded to *kāma* the third *puruṣārtha*, a common aim of human life; with this being so, thus it would then be reasonable to posit a correspondence between *śāntarasa* and *mokṣa* in that it too was a common experience and part of the human condition which was essentially the theme of drama and poetry. Abhinava explained that, with respect to the original three, *mokṣa* is ultimate object of study within the traditional *śāstra*-s, *smṛti*-s, and the *itihāsa*. Abhinava writes:

But (those who insist that *mokṣa* is not suitable to *kāvya*) should be asked: why may not the state of mind conducive to 'liberation,' the highest human goal, not also be capable of transformation into *rasa* . . . whereby (the states) are brought to a condition capable of being enjoyed.⁴¹

Thence, *mokṣa* as the highest human goal needed to be associated with a *sthāyibhāva*; for there is no *rasa* that cannot be corresponded to a *sthāyibhāva*, in that all *rasa*-s are modifications of *sthāyibhāva*-s as so proclaimed Bharata in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*.

Nirveda (indifference, disillusionment) was the first candidate to be considered as the *sthāyibhāva* of *śāntarasa*. *Nirveda*, Abhinavagupta explains, is also the first

(Albany: SUNY, 1990), 26.

³⁸ Abhinavagupta, *The Gītārthasaṅgraha*, trans. Arvind Sharma (Leiden: Brill, 1983), 4.

³⁹ The simultaneity of these two works, the *Abhinavabhāratī* and the *Gītārthasaṅgraha*, is an interesting point to note. We cannot be sure exactly in which text he first expounded upon *mokṣa* and therefore one can only speculate as to which text influenced the other.

⁴⁰ Abhinavagupta, *The Gītārthasaṅgraha*, trans. Arvind Sharma (Leiden: Brill, 1983), 101.

vyabhicāribhāva (transient emotions) listed by Bharata in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Masson and Patwardhan explain that Bharata had a great respect for the concept of *maṅgala*, the practice of beginning a new topic with an auspicious word. But, *nirveda* is not considered as an auspicious word; *nirveda* may be construed as a dislike for things and is thus *amaṅgala*, inauspicious. Abhinavagupta explains that “some people”⁴² then asserted that Bharata must of had a special reason for placing *nirveda* at the top of the list of *vyabhicāribhāva*-s; ultimately, to these people, this meant that Bharata had secretly intended *nirveda* to function in a two-fold manner, that is, as the *sthāyibhāva* of *śāntarasa* and also as a *vyabhicāribhāva*. As a *sthāyibhāva*, *nirveda* is said to arise from *tattvajñāna* (knowledge of the truth), and that it is the only permanent emotion that is powerful enough to overpower the other eight permanent emotions. This *maṅgala*-based argument was ultimately not accepted by Abhinavagupta. V. Raghavan explains that Abhinava does not accept the *nirveda* born of *tattvajñāna* as the *sthāyibhāva* of *śāntarasa*;⁴³ Raghavan writes:

If such Nirveda as is born of Tattvajñāna is the Sthāyin, it means that Tattvajñāna is the Vibhāva. The other Vibhāva-s given, namely Vairāgya, Samādhi, etc., are not Vibhāva-s strictly. If they are included as Vibhāva-s because they are causes producing Tattvajñāna, they are really causes of the cause. The cause of a cause is never called Vibhāva. Further, Nirveda itself is an aversion toward all objects and is not different from Vairāgya. Far from being the product of Tattvajñāna, Nirveda is one of the causes bringing about, for one having aversion to mundane things strives after Mokṣa and acquires Tattvajñāna. It is well know that Mokṣa is directly attained through Tattvajñāna and it is not true to say that one attains Tattvajñāna first, then feels aversion, Vairāgya, and then attains Mokṣa. . . . Tattvajñāna alone results in Mokṣa There is no Nirveda as Sthāyin but only Tattvajñāna. That is the Sthāyin

⁴¹ Edwin Gerow, “Abhinavagupta’s Aesthetics as a Speculative Paradigm,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 114 (1994): 195.

⁴² Abhinavagupta does not supply the names of those theorists who interchange the *bhāva*-s, i.e., the *vyabhicāribhāva*-s with the *sthāyibhāva*-s.

⁴³ Gerow asserts that is not actually Abhinavagupta’s position as Raghavan has asserted, as did Masson and Patwardhan; this position that is being explained by Abhinava is, in Gerow’s opinion, it is a Sāmkhya point of view.

of Śānta.^{44 45}

According to Abhinavagupta then, *tattvajñāna* (knowledge of the truth) is the basis for *mokṣa* and thence describes *tattvajñāna* as thus:

‘Knowledge of the truth’ is nothing but knowledge of the Self, knowledge of a Self, as it were, an object apart (from mundane objects). . . . [The] Self, possessed of untainted qualities such as knowledge and joy, and untouched by affections for presumptive objects, is the stable (basis for śānta).⁴⁶

Ātmajñāna, knowledge of the Self, is then posited to be the unitary basis from which Bharata’s original eight *sthāyibhāva*-s arise which in effect, preserves the original and canonical number of forty nine *bhāva*-s. Abhinava writes:

Its ‘stability’ [the Self] is not to be argued in term of ‘stability’ (of the other emotive states). (The other states) such as sexual passion, whose existence (ever) is to be (either) facilitated or obstructed, in accordance with the appearance or disappearance of various causal factors, are said to ‘stable’ relatively [*āpekṣikatayā*], to the extent that they attach themselves to the wall of the Self, whose nature it is to be ‘stable.’ Knowledge of the truth, however, represents the wall itself (on which are displayed) all the other emotions [*bhāvāntara*], and is (thus), among all the other stable (emotive states), the most stable. It need not be separately mentioned (among the *sthāyibhāvas*) because it by nature is an always realized stable emotional basis, which converts all the other mental states, such as sexual passion and the others, into ancillaries [*vyabhicāribhāvayan*]⁴⁷

For Abhinavagupta, the nature of the Self is peace, *śama*. The attainment of this peace is contingent upon the stimulation by the *bhāva*-s of the latent mental impressions, called *vāsanāntara*, which were installed within a person’s being through experiences in the present life or a previous existence; that is to say, Abhinavagupta asserts that each

⁴⁴ V. Raghavan, *The Number of Rasa*-s 3d rev. ed. (Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1975), 81.

⁴⁵ Prior to Abhinavagupta’s explanation of *tattvajñāna* (knowledge of the truth) as the *sthāyibhāva* of *śāntarasa*, Abhinava dismisses another point of view in which all of the original and canonical *sthāyibhāva*-s of Bharata are connected to *śāntarasa*. See p.198-199 in Edwin Gerow’s article: “Abhinavagupta’s Aesthetics as a Speculative Paradigm,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 114 (1994), and/or p. 129-130 in J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan’s *Śāntarasa and Abhinavagupta’s Philosophy of Aesthetics* (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1969).

person has at some time experienced the presence of the eight permanent emotions, the *sthāyibhāva*-s, within themselves, these eight permanent emotions are actually extensions of the Self, they are projections upon the wall of the Self, which are stimulated into existence via the artistic medium and then de-contextualized and universalized, and thence, tasted by the experient in the blissful form of *śāntarasa*, which is to Abhinavagupta, a geminal form of the Self.

Lastly, with the *sthāyibhāva* in place, Abhinavagupta then lists the *bhāva*-s for *śāntarasa* in the order prescribed by Bharata in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*:

Its conditional factors are [*vibhāva*-s] ascetic detachment, terror in the face of transmutatory existence [*saṃsārabhīrutā*], and the like. . . . Its [*anubhāva*-s] consequential factors are concern for teachings about liberation, etc. Its transitory [*vyabhicāribhāva*-s] (emotional states) are indifference, reflection, recollection, and steadfastness.⁴⁸

Thus ends this essay on the essence and development of *śāntarasa*.

⁴⁶ Edwin Gerow, "Abhinavagupta's Aesthetics as a Speculative Paradigm," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 114 (1994): 199.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 200.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 206.

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